github.com/rclone/rclone
Affected
- introduced
1.48.0, fixed1.73.5(semver)
Fixed versions
1.73.5
Fix
- Fixed version
1.73.5go get github.com/rclone/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: BIT-rclone-2026-41179, CVE-2026-41179, GO-2026-5466
RClone: Unauthenticated operations/fsinfo allows attacker-controlled backend instantiation and local command execution
Summary
The RC endpoint operations/fsinfo is exposed without AuthRequired: true and accepts attacker-controlled fs input. Because rc.GetFs(...) supports inline backend definitions, an unauthenticated attacker can instantiate an attacker-controlled backend on demand. For the WebDAV backend, bearer_token_command is executed during backend initialization, making single-request unauthenticated local command execution possible on reachable RC deployments without global HTTP authentication.
Preconditions
Preconditions for this vulnerability are:
--rc flag or by running the rclone rcd server--rc-addr flag is in use--rc-user/--rc-pass/--rc-htpasswd/etcDetails
The root cause consists of the following pieces:
operations/fsinfo is not protected with AuthRequired: trueoperations/fsinfo calls rc.GetFs(...) on attacker-controlled inputrc.GetFs(...) supports inline backend creation through object-valued fsbearer_token_commandRelevant code paths:
operations/fsinfo is registered without AuthRequired: truercFsInfo() calls rc.GetFs(ctx, in)GetFs() / GetFsNamed() can parse an object-valued fsgetConfigMap() converts attacker-controlled JSON into a backend config stringbearer_token_command is a supported backend optionNewFs(...) calls fetchAndSetBearerToken() when bearer_token_command is setfetchBearerToken() invokes exec.Command(...)This creates a practical single-request unauthenticated command-execution primitive on reachable RC servers without global HTTP authentication.
This was alidated on:
master as of 2026-04-14: bf55d5e6d37fd86164a87782191f9e1ffcaafa82v1.73.4This was also validated on a public amd64 Ubuntu host controlled by the tester, using direct host execution (not containerized PoC execution).
PoC
Minimal single-request form PoC
Start a vulnerable RC server:
rclone rcd --rc-addr 127.0.0.1:5572
No --rc-user, no --rc-pass, no --rc-htpasswd.
Then send a single request:
curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:5572/operations/fsinfo \
--data-urlencode "fs=:webdav,url='http://127.0.0.1/',vendor=other,bearer_token_command='/usr/bin/touch /tmp/rclone_fsinfo_rce_poc_marker':"
Expected result:
operations/fsinfo/tmp/rclone_fsinfo_rce_poc_marker is created on the hostImpact
This is effectively a single-request unauthenticated command-execution vulnerability on reachable RC deployments without global HTTP authentication.
In practice, command execution in the rclone process context can lead to higher-impact outcomes such as local file read, file write, or shell access, depending on the deployed environment.
Testing performed
This was successfully reproduced:
On the public host it was confirmed:
operations/fsinfo exploit workedCritical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
1.48.0, fixed 1.73.5 (semver)1.73.5
1.73.5go get github.com/rclone/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0