github.com/nezhahq/nezha
Affected
- introduced
1.0.0, fixed2.2.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.2.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.2.0go get github.com/nezhahq/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-53522, GO-2026-5831
Nezha Monitoring: Unbounded WebSocket Streams — Resource Exhaustion DoS
1. Description
The Nezha dashboard exposes two endpoints that create long-lived WebSocket streams to monitored agents:
POST /api/v1/terminal → createTerminal() (terminal.go:27-67)POST /api/v1/file → createFM() (fm.go:28-67)Both call rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStream(streamId, ...) which inserts a new ioStreamContext into an unbounded map[string]*ioStreamContext (s.ioStreams in io_stream.go:59-67). There is no per-user rate limit, no global semaphore, and no per-server connection cap. Each stream allocates:
ioStreamContext struct with several channels and sync primitivesStartStream() (io_stream.go:358-369) — bidirectional io.CopyBufferVulnerable code:
terminal.go:27-67 — createTerminal:
func createTerminal(c *gin.Context) (*model.CreateTerminalResponse, error) {
// ... validation ...
rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStream(streamId, getUid(c), server.ID)
// ... sends TaskTypeTerminalGRPC to agent ...
return &model.CreateTerminalResponse{...}, nil
}
fm.go:28-67 — createFM:
func createFM(c *gin.Context) (*model.CreateFMResponse, error) {
// ... validation ...
rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStream(streamId, getUid(c), server.ID)
// ... sends TaskTypeFM to agent ...
return &model.CreateFMResponse{...}, nil
}
io_stream.go:55-67 — CreateStreamWithPurpose (inserts into unbounded map):
func (s *NezhaHandler) CreateStreamWithPurpose(...) {
s.ioStreamMutex.Lock()
defer s.ioStreamMutex.Unlock()
s.ioStreams[streamId] = &ioStreamContext{
creatorUserID: creatorUserID,
targetServerID: targetServerID,
purpose: purpose,
userIoConnectCh: make(chan struct{}),
agentIoConnectCh: make(chan struct{}),
revokedCh: make(chan struct{}),
}
}
io_stream.go:319-372 — StartStream spawns two goroutines per stream:
func (s *NezhaHandler) StartStream(streamId string, timeout time.Duration) error {
// ...
go func() {
_, innerErr := io.CopyBuffer(userIo, agentIo, bp.buf)
errCh <- innerErr
}()
go func() {
_, innerErr := io.CopyBuffer(agentIo, userIo, bp.buf)
errCh <- innerErr
}()
return <-errCh
}
The NezhaHandler.ioStreams map is initialized as a plain make(map[string]*ioStreamContext) in nezha.go:36 — no capacity limit, no eviction policy beyond explicit CloseStream / RevokeStreamsForServer.
The HasPermission check at terminal.go:41-43 and fm.go:43-45 controls access scope but does not limit creation volume. A user with ScopeServerExec (terminal) or ScopeServerRead+Write+Delete (file manager) can open unlimited streams.
2. PoC
A conceptual attack (no Docker needed):
# As an authenticated user with a valid JWT or PAT:
for i in {1..1000}; do
curl -X POST "https://dashboard.example.com/api/v1/terminal" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"server_id": 1}' &
done
wait
Each request:
ioStreamsTaskTypeTerminalGRPC task to the agentGET /ws/terminal/{id}), spawns 2 goroutines for I/O relay and allocates a 1 MB buffer per goroutineThe attack targets three resource domains:
The POST /file (createFM) endpoint provides an alternative path with the same unbounded behavior, using ScopeServerRead+Write+Delete instead of ScopeServerExec.
3. Impact
The attack requires only authenticated access with standard scopes — no special privileges. Any team member with terminal access to a server can DoS the entire infrastructure.
4. Remediation
Implement layered rate limiting and concurrency control:
CreateStream — reject if the user already has N active streams (e.g., 10 per user): func (s *NezhaHandler) CreateStreamWithPurpose(...) {
s.ioStreamMutex.Lock()
defer s.ioStreamMutex.Unlock()
count := 0
for _, ctx := range s.ioStreams {
if ctx.creatorUserID == creatorUserID { count++ }
}
if count >= maxStreamsPerUser { return error }
// ... existing code ...
}
mcp_ratelimit.go) for legacy WebSocket endpointsMedium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
1.0.0, fixed 2.2.0 (semver)2.2.0
2.2.0go get github.com/nezhahq/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0