Advisory

GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq

Also known as: CVE-2026-61647

Summary

@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has a path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory

Details

Summary

The vault_batch MCP tool (and the equivalent POST /batch-to-vault HTTP endpoint) accepted a caller-supplied vault_dir path that was passed directly to path.resolve() + fs.mkdir() with no containment check. A caller — or a prompt-injected LLM driving the MCP — could therefore create directories and write .md / .json answer files anywhere the server process can write.

The slug_prefix parameter had a parallel, smaller traversal vector: it was concatenated into the filename without sanitization, so a prefix containing / or .. could escape the resolved vault directory through the filename component.

Impact

File write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context — or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) — this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup files, etc.) for downstream exploitation.

The vulnerability exists from v1.6.0 (when the HTTP /batch-to-vault endpoint was introduced) and v1.7.0 (when the same logic was exposed as the batch_to_vault MCP tool) through v2.0.2.

Patch

Fixed in v2.0.3:

  • Opt-in containment via `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` env var. When set, vault_dir is resolved relative to that root and realpath-based containment is enforced. Absolute paths or .. segments outside the root are rejected with a clear error.
  • `slug_prefix` is always sanitized. Path separators (/, \), .. sequences and NUL bytes are stripped, length capped at 64 characters. This applies regardless of whether NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT is set.
  • 15 unit tests in src/__tests__/vault-writer.test.ts cover the escape vectors (absolute paths, sibling-prefix attacks, .. traversal, NUL/separator stripping).

Workarounds for users who cannot upgrade

  • Run the MCP server under a dedicated unprivileged user with write access only to the intended vault directory.
  • Do not expose the HTTP /batch-to-vault endpoint beyond localhost.
  • If using an LLM that ingests untrusted content, validate any vault_dir arguments before forwarding them to the MCP.

Configuration requirement after upgrade (important)

v2.0.3 preserves the legacy unrestricted behaviour when NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT is unset, to keep existing single-user local setups working. To enable containment, set `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` in the server environment to a directory that should bound all vault writes.

Credit

Reported by @mcfly-zzh — thanks for the careful diagnosis and follow-up verification.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-09-22 14:43 UTC
Modified
2026-09-22 15:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.6.0, fixed 2.0.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

2.0.3

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences