getgrav/grav
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.16(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.0.16
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-72695
Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion
Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() allows an authenticated user with media management permissions to delete arbitrary files on the server. The method validates only the basename portion of the filename using Utils::checkFilename(), while the directory path (which may contain ../ sequences) is preserved and passed unvalidated to unlink(). This enables directory escape from the intended media storage path.
Severity
High (8.1) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
CWE
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Details
In system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php, the deleteFile() method (lines 332-365) performs filename validation only on the basename, not the full path:
public function deleteFile(string $filename, ?array $settings = null): void
{
$settings = $this->getUploadSettings($settings);
$filesystem = Filesystem::getInstance(false);
// Line 339-340: Only the BASENAME is validated
$basename = $filesystem->basename($filename); // e.g. "evil.jpg" from "../../evil.jpg"
if (!Utils::checkFilename($basename)) { // passes - no traversal in basename
throw new RuntimeException(/* ... */);
}
$path = $settings['destination'] ?? $this->getPath();
// ...
// Line 353: Full pathname (with traversal) is preserved
$pathname = $filesystem->pathname($filename); // "../../"
// Line 356-357: Traversal path reconstructed
[$base, $ext,,] = $this->getFileParts($basename);
$name = "{$pathname}{$base}.{$ext}"; // "../../evil.jpg"
// Line 360: Passed to doRemove()
$this->doRemove($name, $path);
}
doRemove() (line 521-582) then calls:
// Line 538
unlink("{$folder}/{$filename}");
// e.g. unlink("/var/www/grav/user/pages/mypage/../../config/system.yaml")
Utils::checkFilename() (lines 1022-1044) properly checks for /, \, and .., but it is applied to $filesystem->basename($filename) (the last path component only), so traversal sequences in the directory portion are never validated.
Data flow from user input
The vulnerability is reachable through the Flex media handling pipeline:
FlexMediaTrait::setUpdatedMedia() (line 386) iterates form flash data where $filename is the array key - user-controlled$file is null, line 396), NO upload validation is performed (the checkUploadedFile() call at line 401 only executes when $file is truthy)$this->_uploads at line 414saveUpdatedMedia() (line 499) calls $media->deleteFile($filename, $settings) with the unsanitized filenameSibling: renameFile()
The same pattern exists in renameFile() (lines 374-405) which has even weaker validation - it performs NO checkFilename() call at all. While renameFile() currently has no callers in the core codebase, it is part of the public MediaUploadInterface and should be fixed as defense-in-depth.
Proof of Concept
Environment: Grav CMS 2.0.16 with admin plugin
The attack requires an authenticated admin user with page/media editing permissions (not super-admin).
echo "DELETE_ME" > /var/www/grav/user/data/target.txt
POST /admin/pages/mypage/task:save
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
# The form flash data includes a media deletion entry with key:
# "../../data/target.txt" -> null (deletion marker)
saveUpdatedMedia() processes the deletion queue:$filename = ../../data/target.txtdeleteFile("../../data/target.txt") is called$basename = target.txt (passes checkFilename())$pathname = ../../data/$name = ../../data/target.txtdoRemove() calls unlink("/var/www/grav/user/pages/mypage/../../data/target.txt")unlink("/var/www/grav/user/data/target.txt")Impact
An authenticated user with media management permissions can:
user/config/system.yaml, user/config/security.yaml)Suggested Fix
Apply Utils::checkFilename() to the full $filename parameter before decomposing it, or reject any filename containing directory separators or .. sequences:
public function deleteFile(string $filename, ?array $settings = null): void
{
$settings = $this->getUploadSettings($settings);
$filesystem = Filesystem::getInstance(false);
// Validate the FULL filename, not just the basename
if (!Utils::checkFilename($filename)) {
throw new RuntimeException(/* ... */);
}
// ... rest unchanged
}
The same fix should be applied to renameFile() for both $from and $to parameters.
References
system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php lines 332-365, 521-582system/src/Grav/Framework/Flex/Traits/FlexMediaTrait.php lines 386-414, 490-499system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php lines 374-405 (renameFile)Disclosure
This vulnerability was discovered using AI-assisted security research tools.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.0.16 (ecosystem)2.0.16
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0