Advisory

GHSA-jq8v-rmf6-65jw

Also known as: CVE-2026-52798, GO-2026-5477

Summary

Gogs has Stored XSS in .ipynb Preview

Details

Summary

Although .ipynb previews are sanitized on the server side via /-/api/sanitize_ipynb, the inserted content is re-rendered on the client side without sanitization using marked() on elements with the .nb-markdown-cell class. During this process, links containing schemes such as javascript: can be regenerated.

As a result, when a victim views an attacker-crafted .ipynb file and clicks the link, arbitrary JavaScript is executed in the Gogs origin, leading to a click-based Stored XSS.

Details

After the rendered output of a .ipynb file is sanitized via /-/api/sanitize_ipynb and inserted into the DOM, only the Markdown cell portions are re-rendered using `marked()` and overwritten in the DOM. During this process, links with the javascript: scheme can be regenerated.

templates/repo/view_file.tmpl:42–71

{{else if .IsIPythonNotebook}}
  <script>
    $.getJSON("{{.RawFileLink}}", null, function(notebook_json) {
      var notebook = nb.parse(notebook_json);
      var rendered = notebook.render();
      $.ajax({
        type: "POST",
        url: '{{AppSubURL}}/-/api/sanitize_ipynb',
        data: rendered.outerHTML,
        processData: false,
        contentType: false,
      }).done(function(data) {
        $("#ipython-notebook").append(data);
        $("#ipython-notebook code").each(function(i, block) {
          $(block).addClass("py").addClass("python");
          hljs.highlightBlock(block);
        });

        // Overwrite image method to append proper prefix to the source URL
        var renderer = new marked.Renderer();
        var context = '{{.RawFileLink}}';
        context = context.substring(0, context.lastIndexOf("/"));
        renderer.image = function (href, title, text) {
          return `<img src="${context}/${href}"`
        };
        $("#ipython-notebook .nb-markdown-cell").each(function(i, markdown) {
          $(markdown).html(marked($(markdown).html(), {renderer: renderer}));
        });
      });
    });
  </script>

While regular HTML pages (including `.ipynb` preview pages) are served without a Content Security Policy (CSP), CSP headers are applied only to attachment delivery routes.

internal/cmd/web.go:323

c.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox")

Steps to Reproduce

  1. As the attacker, add and push/commit a .ipynb file containing a javascript: link in a Markdown cell to a repository.
  • Example (PoC):

```json
{
"nbformat": 4,
"nbformat_minor": 2,
"metadata": {},
"cells": [
{
"cell_type": "markdown",
"metadata": {},
"source": [
"[poc](javascript:alert(document.domain))"
]
}
]
}
```

  1. The victim opens the file on Gogs (e.g., /<user>/<repo>/src/<branch>/poc.ipynb).

<img width="2386" height="1218" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b0d93fd8-c5ca-4058-8af0-98dee590d3ad" />

  1. When the victim clicks the poc link displayed in the preview, alert(document.domain) is executed in the same Gogs origin.

<img width="2390" height="1388" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0eb6ebe8-632c-4a41-8a11-46471514b4c4" />

Minimum Required Privileges

  • Attacker: Ability to place a .ipynb file as a regular (non-admin) user
  • For example: a general user who can create a public repository and add files.
  • Or: write access (collaborator, etc.) to an existing repository that the victim will view.
  • Victim: Permission to view the repository (a click is required).

Impact

  • Unauthorized actions performed with the victim’s account privileges (e.g., repository settings changes, Issue operations,誘導 to token creation).
  • Theft of information accessible to the victim (repository/Issue/Wiki contents, tokens exposed in page context).
  • If the victim is an administrator, the impact may escalate to instance-wide configuration changes and user management.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-22 23:58 UTC
Modified
2026-07-21 13:30 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

gogs.io/gogs

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.14.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.14.3

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences