Advisory

GHSA-jrh5-vhr9-qh7q

Also known as: CVE-2024-52291

Summary

Local File System Validation Bypass Leading to File Overwrite, Sensitive File Access, and Potential Code Execution

Details

Summary
A vulnerability in CraftCMS allows an attacker to bypass local file system validation by utilizing a double file:// scheme (e.g., file://file:////). This enables the attacker to specify sensitive folders as the file system, leading to potential file overwriting through malicious uploads, unauthorized access to sensitive files, and, under certain conditions, remote code execution (RCE) via Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) payloads.

Note that this will only work if you have an authenticated administrator account with allowAdminChanges enabled.

https://craftcms.com/knowledge-base/securing-craft#set-allowAdminChanges-to-false-in-production

Details
The issue lies in line 57 of cms/src/helpers/FileHelper.php, it only removes file:// on the most left. It is trivial to bypass this sanitization by adding 2 file://, e.g. file://file:////.

    public static function normalizePath($path, $ds = DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR): string
    {
        // Remove any file protocol wrappers
        $path = StringHelper::removeLeft($path, 'file://');

        // Is this a UNC network share path?
        $isUnc = (str_starts_with($path, '//') || str_starts_with($path, '\\\\'));

        // Normalize the path
        $path = parent::normalizePath($path, $ds);

        // If it is UNC, add those slashes back in front
        if ($isUnc) {
            $path = $ds . $ds . ltrim($path, $ds);
        }

        return $path;
    }

PoC

  1. Sign in with an admin account and navigate to Settings → Assets, then create a new volume.
  2. n the Asset Filesystem section, create a new file system and set the Base Path to file://file:////vendor.

Without the prefix, the selection fails.
alt text
With the double file:// prefix, the selection succeeds.
alt text

  1. Access Assets from the left navigation bar, then upload a file into this volume. alt text
  2. The file is successfully uploaded and stored in the sensitive folder specified (e.g., /vendor). alt text
  3. SSTI payloads can be uploaded to /templates folder, though full code execution was not achieved during testing, some payloads were still successful, leading to sensitive information disclosure, among other potential impacts. alt text

Impact
Attackers who compromise an admin account(The admin user is not equal to the server owner) can exploit this flaw to assign sensitive folders as the base path of the filesystem. For instance, if the path /templates is specified (e.g., file://file:////var/www/html/templates), the attacker could upload SSTI payloads. While CraftCMS includes strict SSTI input sanitization, RCE may still be possible if the attacker can craft a valid payload, as seen in similar vulnerabilities (e.g., GHSA-44wr-rmwq-3phw).

Additionally, attackers can upload tampered files to overwrite critical web application files. By enabling public URLs for files in the specified filesystem, they can also retrieve sensitive files (e.g., configuration files from the local file system).

Although the vulnerability is exploitable only in the authenticated users, configuration with ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES=true, there is still a potential security threat.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2024-11-13 14:12 UTC
Modified
2024-11-13 19:08 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

craftcms/cms

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 5.0.0-RC1, fixed 5.4.6 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

5.4.6

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

craftcms/cms

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 4.0.0-RC1, fixed 4.12.5 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.12.5

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences