github.com/portainer/portainer
Affected
- introduced
2.33.0, fixed2.33.8(semver)
Fixed versions
2.33.8
Fix
- Fixed version
2.33.8go get github.com/portainer/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44883, GO-2026-5480
Portainer: JWT accepted in URL query leaks tokens to logs and referers
Summary
Portainer's authentication middleware accepts JWT bearer tokens passed as the ?token=<JWT> URL query parameter on any authenticated API endpoint, in addition to the standard Authorization: Bearer header. URLs are recorded in reverse-proxy access logs, browser history, and HTTP Referer headers on outbound navigation, so any JWT passed this way can be harvested by anyone with access to those logs or by an external site the user subsequently visits. A leaked token grants the full privileges of the user it was issued to, until the token expires (default 8 hours, configurable).
The ?token= parameter was used by Portainer's browser-based container attach, exec, and pod shell features, so any user with exec or attach rights on a container was exposed — not only administrators.
Severity
High
Attack complexity is High because exploitation depends on the attacker obtaining a leaked token from a log, referer, or shared URL. Once obtained, a leaked token grants the privileges of the user it was issued to; for administrator tokens this compromises confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Portainer itself and of every Docker/Kubernetes environment it manages — container exec and stack deployment make host-level compromise reachable, so subsequent-system impact is also High.
Affected Versions
Query-parameter token acceptance has existed since JWT authentication was introduced in Portainer.
Fixes are included in the following releases:
| Branch | First vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---------------------|------------------|------------|
| 2.33.x (LTS) | 2.33.0 | 2.33.8 |
| 2.39.x (LTS) | 2.39.0 | 2.39.2 |
| 2.40.x (STS) | all prior | 2.41.0 |
Portainer releases prior to 2.33.0 are end-of-life and will not receive a fix. Users on EOL versions should upgrade to a supported LTS branch.
Workarounds
Administrators who cannot immediately upgrade can reduce exposure by:
token query parameter before the request reaches Portainer blocks the query-parameter auth path entirely. Container exec and interactive shells rely on the query-parameter token for WebSocket upgrade and will stop working until the patched release is deployed.?token= or &token= occurrences and treat any captured JWT as compromised. Resetting the affected user's password invalidates their sessions; reducing the JWT session timeout in Portainer settings shortens the exposure window for tokens already issued.?token= in chat, email, or tickets, and avoid navigating to external sites from within the Portainer UI on unpatched instances — the Referer header will carry the token.None of these replace the fix.
Affected Code
Pre-fix, extractBearerToken in api/http/security/bouncer.go read the JWT from the token query parameter before falling back to the Authorization header. The query.Del("token") call scrubs the parameter from r.URL.RawQuery on the way through Portainer, but by that point the original URL has already been recorded by any upstream reverse proxy, access logger, or browser.
func extractBearerToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
query := r.URL.Query()
token := query.Get("token")
if token != "" {
query.Del("token")
r.URL.RawQuery = query.Encode()
return token, true
}
tokens, ok := r.Header[jwtTokenHeader]
if !ok || len(tokens) == 0 {
return "", false
}
// ...
}
The fix removes the query-parameter path entirely. Authenticated requests now carry the JWT via the Authorization header for API clients, or via the portainer_api_key HttpOnly cookie for the browser UI — cookies are sent automatically on same-origin WebSocket upgrade requests, so the browser-based container attach, exec, and pod shell features continue to work without exposing the token in the URL. The WebSocket handlers that previously documented ?token= as a required query parameter have been updated to match.
Impact
?token= are recorded in browser history and forwarded in the Referer header on any outbound navigation from the Portainer UI.Timeline
develop.Credit
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
2.33.0, fixed 2.33.8 (semver)2.33.8
2.33.8go get github.com/portainer/[email protected]2.39.0, fixed 2.39.2 (semver)2.39.2
2.39.2go get github.com/portainer/[email protected]2.40.0, fixed 2.41.0 (semver)2.41.0
2.41.0go get github.com/portainer/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0