SIPSorcery
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed10.0.14(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
10.0.14
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-123805
SIPSorcery vulnerable to Denial of Service via out-of-bounds read in SCTP SACK chunk parsing
SummarySctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields (each up to 65535) directly from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk and loops that many times reading 4 bytes per iteration, with no validation of the counts against the chunk length or the receive buffer. A single crafted SACK chunk from a negotiated WebRTC peer forces reads past the end of the 262144-byte receive buffer, raising IndexOutOfRangeException, which is not caught by the recoverable handler and terminates the dedicated SCTP receive thread — permanently killing the SCTP association and all data channels.
Root Causesrc/SIPSorcery/net/SCTP/Chunks/SctpSackChunk.cs:
ushort numGapAckBlocks = NetConvert.ParseUInt16(buffer, startPosn + 8); (:141)ushort numDuplicateTSNs = NetConvert.ParseUInt16(buffer, startPosn + 10); (:142)NetConvert.ParseUInt16/32 (buffer[posn], no bounds check — sys/Net/NetConvert.cs:30,41).SctpPacket.ParseChunks (SctpPacket.cs:195-203) only validates chunkLength >= 4 and posn+chunkLength <= length; the counts inside the value are never checked. RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive calls SctpPacket.Parse(recvBuffer, 0, bytesRead) on a reused recvBuffer = new byte[262144].
ImpactIndexOutOfRangeException is a SystemException, not ApplicationException, so the recoverable catch (ApplicationException) { … continue; } at RTCSctpTransport.cs:345 is skipped and control falls to the generic catch (Exception) { … break; } at :356. The break exits the receive loop, DoReceive returns, and the dedicated _receiveThread = new Thread(DoReceive) (:173, started once) exits with no restart → the SCTP association and every data channel are permanently dead (denial of service).
Proof of Concept
A negotiated WebRTC peer (post-DTLS) sends a checksum-valid SCTP packet: 12-byte common header + a SACK chunk (type 3) with chunkLength=16, numGapAckBlocks=0xFFFF, numDuplicateTSNs=0xFFFF. CRC32C is attacker-computable. The gap-ack loop reaches buffer[262144] on a 262144-byte array (valid indices 0..262143) → IndexOutOfRangeException.
Attack Chain
chunkLength=16, numGapAckBlocks=0xFFFF). Guard: VerifyChecksum (CRC32C). Bypass: CRC32C is computable by the sender.DoReceive (RTCSctpTransport.cs:286) reads into reused recvBuffer (262144 bytes, :280) → SctpPacket.Parse(recvBuffer, 0, bytesRead) (:302) → ParseChunks → SACK dispatch (SctpChunk.Parse :340-341) → SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk. Guard: ParseChunks checks only chunkLength>=4 and posn+chunkLength<=length (SctpPacket.cs:195-203). Bypass: chunkLength=16 is well-formed; the counts are never validated.NetConvert.ParseUInt16(buffer, reportPosn) with reportPosn starting at startPosn(16)+FIXED_PARAMETERS(12)=28, climbing +4 each iteration. Guard: none on the count. Bypass: NetConvert.ParseUInt16 (NetConvert.cs:30) indexes buffer[posn] unchecked.reportPosn = 28 + 65529*4 = 262144 → buffer[262144] → IndexOutOfRangeException → generic catch at RTCSctpTransport.cs:356 → break → receive thread exits, no restart → association permanently dead.Bypass Evidence
NetConvert.ParseUInt16 unchecked indexing (NetConvert.cs:30).ParseChunks validates only chunkLength (SctpPacket.cs:195-203).28 + 65535*4 = 262168 > 262144; buffer is 262144 (DEFAULT_ADVERTISED_RECEIVE_WINDOW, SctpAssociation.cs:62). numGapAckBlocks alone suffices — the dup-TSN loop is not needed.DoReceive catch split: recoverable catch(ApplicationException) at :345 (continue) vs generic catch(Exception) at :356 (break); _receiveThread started once at :176.Affected Versionsnuget:SIPSorcery <= 10.0.13 (verified present on release tag v10.0.13 and HEAD da944543).
Dedup
NOT a duplicate of GHSA-qmvg-569h-hqrh — that fix (fe5a1fa) touched only SctpPacket.cs (the chunk-cursor zero-length infinite loop, CWE-835). This is a distinct out-of-bounds read (CWE-125) in SctpSackChunk count loops, untouched by that fix.
Suggested Fix
Validate startPosn + FIXED_PARAMETERS_LENGTH + numGapAckBlocks*4 + numDuplicateTSNs*4 <= posn + chunkLen before the loops, and/or make NetConvert.Parse* bounds-checked, and/or treat IndexOutOfRangeException/ArgumentException as recoverable in DoReceive.
---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 10.0.14 (ecosystem)10.0.14
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0