github.com/fission/fission
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.24.0(semver)
Fixed versions
1.24.0
Fix
- Fixed version
1.24.0go get github.com/fission/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-50566, GO-2026-5857
Fission: Environment Runtime.Container and Builder.Container SecurityContext bypass allows privileged pod creation
Summary
A follow-up bypass of the round-4 PodSpec hardening (GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7, GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7, GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92). Those advisories validate and sanitize the PodSpec (spec.runtime.podSpec / spec.builder.podSpec /function.spec.podSpec), but the Environment CRD also exposes spec.runtime.container and spec.builder.container — a standalone Container merged into the runtime/builder pod whose SecurityContext bypassed both layers.
Details
Admission-layer gap. Environment.Validate() calls ValidatePodSpecSafety() on Runtime.PodSpec and Builder.PodSpec only. That function takes a *PodSpec, so it never inspects the standalone Runtime.Container.SecurityContext
or Builder.Container.SecurityContext.
Merge-layer gap. sanitizeContainerSecurityContext() ran only inside MergePodSpec(). The container field is merged via MergeContainer(), which did not sanitize. With only Runtime.Container set and Runtime.PodSpec nil,MergePodSpec is never invoked, so the sanitizer never ran.
Affected merge sites: poolmgr (gp_deployment.go), newdeploy (newdeploy.go), and buildermgr (envwatcher.go).
Proof of concept
apiVersion: fission.io/v1
kind: Environment
metadata:
name: priv-escape-test
namespace: default
spec:
version: 3
runtime:
image: "ghcr.io/fission/python-env:latest"
container:
name: priv-escape-test
securityContext:
privileged: true
poolsize: 1
The admission webhook accepts this Environment and the resulting pool pod runs with privileged: true. Equivalent bypasses: allowPrivilegeEscalation: true, capabilities.add: ["SYS_ADMIN"], `capabilities.add:
["NET_ADMIN","SYS_PTRACE"]. The same attack applies to Builder.Container`.
Impact
A tenant with environments.fission.io create/update RBAC can run privileged / allowPrivilegeEscalation / dangerous-capability containers in the Fission function or builder namespace, scheduled under the executor's high-privilege
service account — enabling container-sandbox escape, host filesystem and network access, and potential node- and cluster-level compromise. Identical blast radius to GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7.
Fix
Fixed in #3406 and released in v1.24.0.
ValidateContainerSafety in pkg/apis/core/v1/podspec_safety.go applies the per-container SecurityContext denylist (privileged, allowPrivilegeEscalation, dangerous capabilities) to astandalone container, and is called from Environment.Validate() for Runtime.Container and Builder.Container.
sanitizeContainerSecurityContext() is now invoked inside MergeContainer() itself, covering all three executor/builder call sites.Workarounds
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted.References
e484df84).Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 1.24.0 (semver)1.24.0
1.24.0go get github.com/fission/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0