eventsource-encoder
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.0.2(semver)
Fixed versions
1.0.2
Fix
- Fixed version
1.0.2npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44214
eventsource-encoder vulnerable to SSE event injection via unsanitized event and id fields
Summary
eventsource-encoder does not sanitize the event or id fields of an EventSourceMessage before serializing them. An attacker who controls either field can inject arbitrary Server-Sent Events line terminators (\n, \r, or \r\n) and thereby forge additional SSE fields or entire messages on the stream. This is similar in spirit to GHSA-4hxc-9384-m385 (h3), but the vulnerable fields are event/id rather than data/comment. These are less likely to be user-controllable, but should still be sanitized.
Details
In src/encode.ts, encodeMessage interpolates event and id into the output without inspecting them for line terminators:
if (message.event) {
output += `event: ${message.event}\n`
}
// ...
if (typeof message.id === 'string' || typeof message.id === 'number') {
output += `id: ${message.id}\n`
}
The SSE specification treats \r, \n, and \r\n as line terminators. A \n (or \r) embedded in either field is rendered as the end of that field, allowing the rest of the input to be interpreted by the client as new SSE fields.
By contrast, data and comment already normalize all three line-terminator forms via NEWLINES_RE = /(\r\n|\r|\n)/g, so they are not affected.
Proof of concept
import {encode} from 'eventsource-encoder'
// Attacker-controlled value flows into `event`
const userSuppliedTopic = 'message\nevent: admin\ndata: {"role":"admin"}'
console.log(encode({event: userSuppliedTopic, data: 'hello'}))
Output:
event: message
event: admin
data: {"role":"admin"}
data: hello
The browser sees two events: a forged admin event with attacker-chosen payload, followed by the legitimate message event. The same primitive works through id for any string id value.
Impact
If untrusted input is passed into the event or id field of a message, an attacker can:
data:, id:, retry:) into the streamencode() call into multiple distinct browser eventsLast-Event-ID via injected id: linesThe vulnerability requires that an application places attacker-controlled data into event or id. Applications that only put trusted, statically-defined values into these fields are not affected.
Patches
Fixed in [email protected]. The event and string id fields are now validated; any value containing \r or \n causes the encoder to throw a TypeError rather than emit a malformed stream.
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade, validate or strip line terminators from any untrusted value before passing it to encode / encodeMessage:
function safeSingleLine(value) {
if (/[\r\n]/.test(value)) throw new Error('SSE field must be single-line')
return value
}
encode({event: safeSingleLine(topic), id: safeSingleLine(id), data})
Resources
Credit
Discovered while reviewing in light of GHSA-4hxc-9384-m385.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 1.0.2 (semver)1.0.2
1.0.2npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0