i18next-locize-backend
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed9.0.2(semver)
Fixed versions
9.0.2
Fix
- Fixed version
9.0.2npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-41885
i18next-locize-backend has URL Injection via Unsanitized Path Parameters
Summary
Versions of i18next-locize-backend prior to 9.0.2 interpolate lng, ns, projectId, and version directly into the configured loadPath / privatePath / addPath / updatePath / getLanguagesPath URL templates with no path-component validation and no encoding. When an application exposes any of these values to user-controlled input (?lng= / ?ns= query parameters via i18next-browser-languagedetector, cookies, request headers, or a URL-derived projectId), a crafted value can change the structure of the outgoing request URL.
Affected call sites in lib/index.js (pre-patch): the interpolate() helper is used at the five URL-build sites — _readAny/read (line 415 for private, 426 for public), getLanguages (lines 271 and 296), and writePage (lines 616 and 622) for the missing-key and update POST paths. The helper interpolate in lib/utils.js substitutes raw values with no encoding.
Impact
An attacker who can influence lng, ns, projectId, or version can:
lng = '../../admin' against https://api.locize.app/{{projectId}}/{{version}}/{{lng}}/{{ns}} changes the request URL path segment that reaches the locize CDN / API.lng = 'en?x=y' appends an attacker-chosen query to the URL.lng = 'en#x' silently truncates the path in browser fetches.lng = 'en%2F..' leverages server-side decoding to reintroduce /...The worst-case concrete impact is loading an unintended translation resource (potentially causing wrong content to render) and, when a custom loadPath is configured against an internal / file-scheme URL, SSRF or arbitrary-file read on the host running the backend.
Additionally, the pre-patch interpolate() function read data[key] without excluding prototype-chain properties — under prototype-pollution conditions in the same process, that path could pull values from Object.prototype into the URL.
Related fixes shipped in 9.0.2
defaults() helper replaces for...in iteration with Object.keys() plus an explicit prototype-key guard so a polluted Object.prototype cannot leak into the merged options object.utils.interpolateUrl / isSafeUrlSegment / sanitizeLogValue / redactUrlCredentials helpers mirror the pattern shipped in [email protected] (see its advisory GHSA-q89c-q3h5-w34g).Affected versions
All versions of i18next-locize-backend prior to 9.0.2.
Patch
Fixed in 9.0.2. lib/index.js now uses interpolateUrl() at every URL-build site and returns an error callback (or silently drops the queued write for writePage) when any interpolated value fails the safety check. Legitimate i18next language-code shapes (BCP-47, en_US, zh-Hant-HK, my-custom.ns, +-joined multi-language values) all pass.
Workarounds
No workaround short of upgrading. If you cannot upgrade immediately, sanitise lng / ns / projectId / version at your application boundary before passing them through to i18next — reject values containing .., /, \, ?, #, %, whitespace, control characters, and cap the length.
Credits
Discovered via an internal security audit of the i18next / locize ecosystem.
References
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 9.0.2 (semver)9.0.2
9.0.2npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0