code.gitea.io/gitea
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.26.2(semver)
Fixed versions
1.26.2
Fix
- Fixed version
1.26.2go get code.gitea.io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-26231, GO-2026-5510
Gitea: Authorization Bypass via "Allow edits from maintainers" allows unauthorized commits to any readable repo
Summary
Any authenticated low-privilege user with read access to a repository can push arbitrary commits directly to that repository, bypassing all write-access checks.
Vulnerability
Gitea's "Allow edits from maintainers" PR option can be abused via reverse-fork PRs:
allow_maintainer_edit=true without verifying that the submitter has write access to the HEAD repository.git push over HTTP/SSH, Gitea relaxes the required access mode to Read when SupportProcReceive is enabled (`routers/web/repo/githttp.go`, `routers/private/serv.go`) and defers enforcement to the pre-receive hook.models/issues/pull_list.go), which finds the malicious PR, sees AllowMaintainerEdit=true, and checks whether the pusher has write access to the BASE repo. Since BASE is the attacker's own fork, the check passes and the push is authorized against the upstream.Exploitation
BASE = their_fork, HEAD = upstream, and "Allow edits from maintainers" checked.git push <upstream_url> <branch> — the push is accepted.Reproduction
python3 poc.py --repo http://gitea:3000/victim/repo --user attacker --password attacker_pass
Expected output:
[+] target: victim/my_repo default branch: main
[*] forking -> attacker/my_repo_pocfork (202)
[+] fork ready
[+] malicious PR created (BASE=attacker fork, HEAD=upstream)
remote: . Processing 1 references
remote: Processed 1 references in total
To http://192.168.101.20:3000/victim/my_repo.git
e5c07b3..9a0b884 main -> main
[+] latest commit on victim/my_repo@main: 'PoC: unauthorized commit via maintainer-edit bypass'
[+] CONFIRMED: unauthorized push to upstream succeeded.
A PWNED.txt file will appear on the target repo's default branch, committed by the attacker who has no write access.
Impact
Full repository compromise. Any logged-in user can backdoor any repository they can read, including all public repositories on the instance.
Suggested Fix
Two independent checks are missing; both should be added for defense in depth:
AllowMaintainerEdit = true, verify the submitter has write access to the HEAD repository.AllowMaintainerEdit solely based on BASE write access.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.26.2 (semver)1.26.2
1.26.2go get code.gitea.io/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0