Advisory

GHSA-mphv-75cg-56wg

Also known as: CVE-2026-27795

Summary

LangChain Community: redirect chaining can lead to SSRF bypass via RecursiveUrlLoader

Details

Summary
A redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in RecursiveUrlLoader in @langchain/community. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying fetch to follow redirects automatically, which permits a transition from a safe public URL to an internal or metadata endpoint without revalidation. This is a bypass of the SSRF protections introduced in 1.1.14 (CVE-2026-26019).

Affected Component

  • Package: @langchain/community
  • Component: RecursiveUrlLoader
  • Configuration: preventOutside (default: true) is insufficient to prevent this bypass when redirects are followed automatically.

Description
RecursiveUrlLoader is a web crawler that recursively follows links from a starting URL. The existing SSRF mitigation validates the initial URL before fetching, but it does not re-validate when the request follows redirects. Because fetch follows redirects by default, an attacker can supply a public URL that passes validation and then redirects to a private network address, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoint.

This constitutes a “check‑then‑act” gap in the request lifecycle: the safety check occurs before the redirect chain is resolved, and the final destination is never validated.

Impact
If an attacker can influence content on a page being crawled (e.g., user‑generated content, untrusted external pages), they can cause the crawler to:

  • Fetch cloud instance metadata (AWS, GCP, Azure), potentially exposing credentials or tokens
  • Access internal services on private networks (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)
  • Connect to localhost services
  • Exfiltrate response data through attacker-controlled redirect chains

This is exploitable in any environment where RecursiveUrlLoader runs with access to internal networks or metadata services, which includes most cloud-hosted deployments.

Attack Scenario

  1. The crawler is pointed at a public URL that passes initial SSRF validation.
  2. That URL responds with a 3xx redirect to an internal target.
  3. The fetch follows the redirect automatically without revalidation.
  4. The crawler accesses the internal or metadata endpoint.

Example redirector:

https://302.r3dir.me/--to/?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/

Root Cause

  • SSRF validation (validateSafeUrl) is only performed on the initial URL.
  • Redirects are followed automatically by fetch (redirect: "follow" default), so the request can change destinations without additional validation.

Resolution
Upgrade to @langchain/community >= 1.1.18, which validates every redirect hop by disabling automatic redirects and re-validating Location targets before following them.

  • Automatic redirects are disabled (redirect: "manual").
  • Each 3xx Location is resolved and validated with validateSafeUrl() before the next request.
  • A maximum redirect limit prevents infinite loops.

Reources

  • Original SSRF fix (CVE-2026-26019): enforced origin comparison and added initial URL validation
  • https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs/security/advisories/GHSA-gf3v-fwqg-4vh7

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-02-25 22:59 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:50 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@langchain/community

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.1.18 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.1.18

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences