node-opcua
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected2.165.0(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-54155
node-opcua missing nonce verification in UserNameIdentityToken authentication
Summary
A missing nonce verification in the UserNameIdentityToken authentication handler allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to forge a password token that extracts as an empty string, and to replay captured authentication tokens across sessions.
Affected versions: <= 2.165.0
Tested version: 2.165.0
CVSS Score: 8.1 (High)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
CWE: CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
---
Root Cause
In packages/node-opcua-server/source/opcua_server.ts at line 1886-1887, after RSA-OAEP decrypting the UserNameIdentityToken password blob, the server reads a 4-byte little-endian length field and extracts buff[4 : 4+length] as the password. It never verifies that the trailing bytes equal session.nonce.
This has two consequences:
GetEndpoints call can craft a token where the 4-byte length field equals serverNonce.length (32). The server computes length = 32 - 32 = 0 and calls isValidUser(username, ""). Any account that accepts an empty password is compromised.The impact is compounded by a second issue: when the channel uses SecurityMode=None, verifyClientSignature returns true unconditionally (security_policy.ts:697-700), bypassing the channel-level signature check entirely.
---
Proof of Concept (logic, no exploit code)
1. GetEndpoints (unauthenticated) → retrieve server public key and RSA token policy
2. OpenSecureChannel (SecurityMode=None)
3. CreateSession
4. Craft plaintext: [0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00] (readUInt32LE = 32 = serverNonce.length)
5. RSA-OAEP encrypt with server public key → 256-byte ciphertext
6. ActivateSession with crafted UserNameIdentityToken
7. Server decrypts → length = 32 - 32 = 0 → password = ""
8. isValidUser(username, "") is called
Dynamically confirmed: decryption produces password = "" with no error and no nonce verification.
---
Suggested Fix
After decrypting the password blob, verify that buff.slice(4 + passwordLength) equals session.nonce before extracting the password. Reject the token if verification fails.
---
I am following a 90-day responsible disclosure policy. I am happy to provide additional technical details under embargo. Please confirm receipt at your earliest convenience.
Reporter: Stanley Tobias
Discovery date: 2026-03-23
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 2.165.0 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0