github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.61.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.61.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.61.0go get github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-28492, GO-2026-4585
FileBrowser has Path Traversal in Public Share Links that Exposes Files Outside Shared Directory
Summary
When a user creates a public share link for a directory, the withHashFile middleware in http/public.go (line 59) uses filepath.Dir(link.Path) to compute the BasePathFs root. This sets the filesystem root to the parent directory instead of the shared directory itself, allowing anyone with the share link to browse and download files from all sibling directories.
Details
In http/public.go lines 52-64, the withHashFile function handles public share link requests:
basePath := link.Path // e.g. "/documents/shared"
filePath := ""
if file.IsDir {
basePath = filepath.Dir(basePath) // BUG: becomes "/documents" (parent!)
filePath = ifPath
}
d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath)
When a directory at /documents/shared is shared, filepath.Dir("/documents/shared") evaluates to "/documents". The BasePathFs is then rooted at the parent directory /documents/, giving the share link access to everything under /documents/ - not just the intended /documents/shared/.
This affects both publicShareHandler (directory listing via /api/public/share/{hash}) and publicDlHandler (file download via /api/public/dl/{hash}/path).
PoC
/documents/shared/public-file.txt (intended to be shared)/documents/secrets/passwords.txt (NOT intended to be shared)/documents/private/financial.csv (NOT intended to be shared)/documents/shared (via POST /api/share/documents/shared)GET /api/public/share/{hash}/documents/shared//documents/ (parent), revealing secrets/, private/, and shared/ directoriesGET /api/public/dl/{hash}/secrets/passwords.txtStandalone Go test reproducing the exact vulnerable code path with afero.NewBasePathFs:
func TestShareScopeEscape(t *testing.T) {
baseFs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
afero.WriteFile(baseFs, "/documents/shared/public.txt", []byte("public"), 0644)
afero.WriteFile(baseFs, "/documents/secrets/passwords.txt", []byte("admin:hunter2"), 0644)
linkPath := "/documents/shared"
basePath := filepath.Dir(linkPath) // BUG: "/documents"
scopedFs := afero.NewBasePathFs(baseFs, basePath)
// Sibling file is accessible through the share:
f, err := scopedFs.Open("/secrets/passwords.txt")
// err is nil - file accessible! Content: "admin:hunter2"
}
This test passes, confirming the vulnerability.
Impact
Unauthenticated information disclosure (CWE-200, CWE-706). Anyone with a public share link for a directory can:
All filebrowser v2.x installations that use directory sharing are affected.
Recommended Fix
Remove the filepath.Dir() call and use link.Path directly as the BasePathFs root:
if file.IsDir {
// Don't change basePath - keep it as link.Path
filePath = ifPath
}
d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath)
Affected commit: e3d00d591b567a8bfe3b02e42ba586859002c77d (latest)
File: http/public.go, line 59
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.61.0 (semver)2.61.0
2.61.0go get github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0