rustfs
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.0.2(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-39360
RustFS has an authorization bypass in multipart UploadPartCopy enables cross-bucket object exfiltration
RustFS contains a missing authorization check in the multipart copy path (UploadPartCopy). A low-privileged user who cannot read objects from a victim bucket can still exfiltrate victim objects by copying them into an attacker-controlled multipart upload and completing the upload.
This breaks tenant isolation in multi-user / multi-tenant deployments.
Impact
Unauthorized cross-bucket / cross-tenant data exfiltration (Confidentiality: High).
An attacker with only minimal permissions on their own bucket (multipart upload + Put/Get on destination objects) can copy and retrieve objects from a victim bucket without having s3:GetObject (or equivalent) permission on the source.
In the attached PoC, the attacker successfully exfiltrates a 5MB private object and proves integrity via matching SHA256 and size.
Threat Model (Realistic)
victim-bucket-*) and stores private objects (e.g., private/finance_dump.bin).ListObjects, HeadObject, GetObject, or CopyObject from the victim bucket.CreateMultipartUpload, UploadPart, UploadPartCopy, CompleteMultipartUpload, AbortMultipartUpload,PutObject/GetObject for objects in attacker bucket.Root Cause Analysis
The access control layer fails open for multipart copy-related operations:
File: rustfs/src/storage/access.rs
abort_multipart_upload() returns Ok(()) without authorization (L435–437)complete_multipart_upload() returns Ok(()) without authorization (L442–444)upload_part_copy() returns Ok(()) without authorization (L1446–1448)In contrast, copy_object() correctly enforces authorization:
GetObject authorization (L469)PutObject authorization (L478)The multipart copy implementation reads the source object directly:
File: rustfs/src/app/multipart_usecase.rs
store.get_object_reader(&src_bucket, &src_key, ...) (L959–962)Because upload_part_copy() does not enforce source GetObject authorization, the server reads and copies victim data even when the requester lacks permission.
Affected Versions
main @ c1d5106acc3480c275a52344df84633bb6dcd8f01.0.0-alpha.86-3-gc1d5106aThe fail-open authorization behavior for UploadPartCopy was introduced in:
09ea11c13 (per git blame on rustfs/src/storage/access.rs:1443-1448)Affected range (recommended wording):
09ea11c13 through c1d5106acc3480c275a52344df84633bb6dcd8f0 (and likely any releases containing those commits) until a fix is applied.Package version (Cargo metadata)
rustfs crate version in this tree: 0.0.5 (cargo metadata)Proof of Concept (PoC) – Real Commands + Verified Results
Files
Place the PoC script at the repository root:
upload_part_copy_debug_redacted.log (Authorization/signature redacted)Environment
RustFS running locally (Docker is simplest), listening on:
http://127.0.0.1:9000Tools:
awscli, jq, awscurlSteps to Reproduce
docker compose -f docker-compose-simple.yml up -d
chmod +x poc_uploadpartcopy_exfil_v3.sh
./poc_uploadpartcopy_exfil_v3.sh | tee poc_v3_output.txt
Attachments
Expected Behavior
ListObjects -> AccessDeniedHeadObject -> AccessDeniedGetObject -> AccessDeniedCopyObject -> AccessDeniedUploadPartCopy from victim -> attacker multipart should also be denied.Actual Behavior
Observed PoC Output
Victim uploads a private object:
5,242,880 bytesfda018db1da9d8f4c1b287c75943384a3b4ede391ec156039b6d94e17d6ad68fAttacker exfiltrates it via multipart copy:
5,242,880 bytesfda018db1da9d8f4c1b287c75943384a3b4ede391ec156039b6d94e17d6ad68fProof:
Network Evidence (Redacted)
The debug log shows a successful request with:
PUT/<attacker-bucket>/<dst-key>?partNumber=1&uploadId=...x-amz-copy-source: <victim-bucket>/private/finance_dump.binHTTP/1.1 200 with <CopyPartResult><ETag>...</ETag>...</CopyPartResult>Fix
Implement authorization checks equivalent to copy_object() for multipart copy paths:
upload_part_copy:GetObject authorization on x-amz-copy-sourcePutObject authorization on the target objectcopy_object() on the source.complete_multipart_upload:PutObject authorizationabort_multipart_upload:PutObject as a safe boundary)Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 0.0.2 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0