github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.33.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.33.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.33.0go get github.com/iskorotkov/avro/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: GO-2026-5048
iskorotkov/avro: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in Decoder
Memory Exhaustion via Unbounded Map Allocations in Avro Decoder
Summary
The Avro map decoder accepted attacker-controlled block-element counts from the wire format and grew the destination map without enforcing an upper bound. The slice decoder already had Config.MaxSliceAllocSize for the equivalent attack against arrays; the map decoder had no analogous limit, so a producer could declare an arbitrarily large map (in one block, or chunked across many sub-limit blocks) and exhaust process memory until the OOM killer fired.
The fix introduces Config.MaxMapAllocSize with cumulative enforcement across block boundaries. The new limit is opt-in: the field defaults to zero, which preserves the previous unbounded behavior for backward compatibility. Upgrading to `v2.33.0` alone does not mitigate the issue — consumers of untrusted Avro data must explicitly set MaxMapAllocSize on their avro.Config.
Description
Avro maps are encoded as a sequence of blocks; each block declares a long element count followed by that many key/value pairs. The decoder uses these counts both to size the destination map and as the loop bound for reading entries.
Pre-fix, the map decoder enforced no upper limit at any layer:
make(map[...]..., n) or before growing the map.The slice decoder had been hardened via Config.MaxSliceAllocSize and tracked cumulatively across blocks; the map decoder was a missing-by-symmetry gap. Even a partial per-block bound on maps would have been insufficient on its own — Avro permits encoding a logical map as many small blocks, so a producer could split a 10 GB map into 10,000 sub-MaxMapAllocSize blocks and still drive total allocation past any single-block threshold. The fix tracks cumulative entry count at block-header boundaries — *before* the block's entries are decoded into the map — and errors out before allocation when the running total would exceed the configured cap.
Two decoder variants were affected, both in codec_map.go:
mapDecoder.Decode — string-keyed maps.mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode — encoding.TextUnmarshaler-keyed maps (e.g. map[CustomKey]V where *CustomKey implements UnmarshalText).Affected components
| File | Symbol | Pre-fix behavior | Post-fix behavior |
|------|--------|------------------|-------------------|
| config.go | Config.MaxMapAllocSize | Field did not exist | New int field; default zero means unlimited (back-compat) |
| codec_map.go | mapDecoder.Decode | Read block count, grew map unbounded | Validates cumulative count against MaxMapAllocSize at each block header |
| codec_map.go | mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode | Same | Same |
PR #5 (fix/map-alloc-chunking-bypass) covers both decoders and adds chunking-attack tests for both. The same PR also adds the previously-missing chunking-attack test coverage for the slice path in 534c7518 — the slice *logic* was already correct, only its test coverage was incomplete.
Technical details
The fix mirrors the slice decoder's pattern:
int64.Config.MaxMapAllocSize (when nonzero), return an error before allocating any of that block's entries.Per-block enforcement alone would be bypassable by chunking; cumulative tracking closes that. The check sits at the block-header read, *before* per-entry allocation, so a single oversized block also cannot allocate first and then fail post-hoc.
Config.MaxMapAllocSize semantics match Config.MaxSliceAllocSize: zero means unlimited, any positive value is the cumulative cap on element count (not byte size).
Fixed behavior
v2.33.0 adds the MaxMapAllocSize configuration field and the cumulative-enforcement logic in both map decoders. Both decoders return a descriptive error when the cumulative entry count would exceed the configured cap; no entries are allocated past the limit.
Tests added in PR #5 cover, for both mapDecoder and mapDecoderUnmarshaler:
Affected versions
github.com/hamba/avro/v2 — all versions up to and including v2.31.0 (repository is read-only upstream).github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 — all versions prior to v2.33.0. Note: v2.33.0 and later are vulnerable *by default* and only protected when MaxMapAllocSize is explicitly configured — see Mitigation.Fixed versions
github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0 and later, with `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` explicitly set to a non-zero value.
A bare upgrade to v2.33.0 without setting MaxMapAllocSize leaves the decoder in the same unbounded state as v2.32.0. This is a backward-compatibility choice; a future major version may flip the default. Until then, treat this advisory as requiring both an upgrade *and* a configuration change.
There is no upstream fix for github.com/hamba/avro/v2 — module path is archived. Migrate to the fork as described under Mitigation.
Mitigation
Migrate from github.com/hamba/avro/v2 to github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 >= v2.33.0 and configure an allocation cap appropriate for your schema. The recommended approach for processes that decode untrusted input is a dedicated frozen config, used at every relevant call site, rather than mutating avro.DefaultConfig:
cfg := avro.Config{
MaxByteSliceSize: 102_400,
MaxSliceAllocSize: 10_000,
MaxMapAllocSize: 10_000,
}.Freeze()
decoder := cfg.NewDecoder(schema, reader)
Choose the values based on the largest legitimate map your schema produces; a value 2–10× that ceiling provides headroom for benign variance while still bounding worst-case memory.
For consumers that prefer the original import path, a replace directive in go.mod is supported:
replace github.com/hamba/avro/v2 => github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0
replace is honoured only for the main module of a build — transitive consumers must add their own replace, or migrate the import path directly.
If you cannot upgrade immediately, the only structural workarounds are out-of-band: run decoders in memory-constrained child processes or cgroups so an OOM is contained, reject inputs from sources without resource controls, and apply per-request decode deadlines so a runaway decode at least times out before the OOM killer fires.
Proof-of-concept input
Two attack shapes, both targeting map[string]int:
Single-block, oversize block count. Emit one block header declaring n = 2³¹ − 1 (or any value whose n × averageEntrySize exceeds available memory) followed by truncated entries. Pre-fix, the decoder pre-allocates make(map[string]int, n), which fails or stalls long before EOF is reached.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.33.0 (semver)2.33.0
2.33.0go get github.com/iskorotkov/avro/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0