goshs.de/goshs/v2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.7(semver)
Fixed versions
2.0.7
Fix
- Fixed version
2.0.7go get goshs.de/goshs/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: GO-2026-5519
goshs: SSH host key verification disabled, allowing transparent MITM of every tunnelled HTTP request
Summary
The --tunnel / -t flag opens an outbound SSH connection to localhost.run:22 with HostKeyCallback: ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey(). The Go documentation for that function states verbatim: *"It should not be used for production code."* With the callback disabled the client accepts any host key the server presents, so an attacker who can intercept the operator's TCP connection to localhost.run:22 (any router on the path, malicious local network, ARP/DNS spoof on the operator's LAN, BGP hijack, malicious VPN) can present their own SSH host key, terminate the SSH session locally, and proxy onward — sitting transparently in the middle of the tunnel.
Because localhost.run does TLS termination at their end, the HTTP traffic on the SSH leg is plaintext, so the on-path attacker reads and rewrites every request and response in cleartext. The goshs operator gets no warning; the public URL works normally.
Affected Code
File: tunnel/tunnel.go
func Start(localIP string, localPort int) (*Tunnel, error) {
config := &ssh.ClientConfig{
User: "nokey",
Auth: []ssh.AuthMethod{ssh.Password("")},
HostKeyCallback: ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey(), // accepts any server key
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
BannerCallback: func(banner string) error { return nil },
}
client, err := ssh.Dial("tcp", "localhost.run:22", config)
...
}
There is no fallback verification — no ssh.FixedHostKey, no known_hosts read, no TOFU pin. Every invocation of goshs --tunnel is equally vulnerable.
Exploit Chain
goshs --tunnel. tunnel.Start() opens an SSH client to localhost.run:22 with InsecureIgnoreHostKey().arpspoof + DNS spoof on the operator's LAN) intercepts the outbound TCP connection to localhost.run:22 and answers with their own SSH server.HostKeyCallback returns nil unconditionally. Handshake completes; the client believes it is talking to localhost.run.localhost.run:22, forwarding the URL capture so Start() reads back the genuine https://*.lhr.life line and returns successfully. The operator sees the public URL printed to stdout exactly as expected.Authorization value sent by every visitor.Set-Cookie attributes.Impact
Authorization, file contents, share-link tokens, the ?goshs-info JSON dump).<script> into HTML responses, swap offered binaries for backdoored ones.Preconditions
goshs --tunnel / goshs -t.localhost.run:22 (LAN MITM, malicious Wi-Fi, hostile ISP/VPN, BGP hijack, or DNS spoofing combined with an attacker-controlled SSH endpoint).---
Fix (applied in v2.0.7)
ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey() has been replaced with a Trust-On-First-Use (TOFU) host key callback backed by ~/.config/goshs/known_hosts.
Behaviour after the fix:
localhost.run, writes it to ~/.config/goshs/known_hosts (mode 0600), and prints two warning lines: WARN tunnel: pinned new host key for localhost.run:22 (SHA256:<fingerprint>) in ~/.config/goshs/known_hosts
WARN tunnel: verify with: ssh-keyscan localhost.run 2>/dev/null | ssh-keygen -l -f -
The operator should compare the printed fingerprint against the ssh-keyscan output to confirm no MITM occurred on that first connection.
golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts and the presented key is verified against it. A mismatch returns a typed HostKeyMismatchError and goshs exits immediately with: FATAL tunnel: ssh: host key mismatch for localhost.run:22 — possible MITM attack.
If localhost.run legitimately rotated its key, delete ~/.config/goshs/known_hosts and reconnect
Files changed:
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| config/config.go | Added Dir() — creates and returns ~/.config/goshs (mode 0700) |
| main.go | Calls config.Dir() on every startup to ensure the directory exists |
| tunnel/tunnel.go | Replaced InsecureIgnoreHostKey() with buildTOFUCallback(knownHostsFile); added exported HostKeyMismatchError type |
| httpserver/server.go | Resolves ~/.config/goshs/known_hosts via config.Dir(), passes it to tunnel.Start(); fatal-exits on HostKeyMismatchError |
Implementation uses only already-vendored dependencies (golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts is part of the existing golang.org/x/crypto direct dependency — no new modules added).
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.0.7 (semver)2.0.7
2.0.7go get goshs.de/goshs/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0