Advisory

GHSA-p28v-f755-9qrg

Also known as: CVE-2026-73654

Summary

Trigger.dev: Prototype pollution via run metadata operations → process-wide cross-tenant DoS

Details

Summary

The run-metadata update endpoint PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata applies client-supplied
"operations" by passing the attacker-controlled `operation.key` straight into
new JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set(newMetadata, value)
(packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts:22-23), with no prototype-pollution guard
(@jsonhero/path@^1.0.21 does not reject __proto__/constructor/prototype).

A request with key: "$.__proto__.polluted" sets `Object.prototype.polluted` in the webapp
process. Because every plain object then inherits that property, it corrupts unrelated code
process-wide and across tenants — including Prisma query building and the Prometheus metrics
client — causing query failures, broken authentication for other tenants' workers, and an
uncaughtException (denial of service). Only a normal, low-privilege environment API key is
required (one request).

Severity

A single request from any holder of a normal environment API key contaminates Object.prototype
in the shared webapp process, breaking other tenants' workers (scope change) and degrading/
crashing the process (high availability impact). Prototype pollution is also a primitive for
further gadget chains (integrity/confidentiality).

Affected versions

  • Introduced in commit 34f8bd588 ("Add ability to update parent and root run metadata from children", PR #1563, 2025-01-08) — the JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set() sink is present from the first commit of operations.ts. SDK was at 3.3.8 at that time.
  • Still present at HEAD (SDK 4.5.0-rc.7); operations.ts unchanged since 2025-05, and @jsonhero/path is pinned at ^1.0.21 (no proto-guard) throughout.
  • Affected range: >= v3.3.8 (metadata operations API) through v4-beta / current v4.x — fixed: 4.5.6.

Root cause

packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts — applyMetadataOperations() builds a path from
the untrusted operation.key and writes to it, for every operation type (set, append,
increment, …):

const path = new JSONHeroPath(operation.key);   // operation.key fully attacker-controlled
path.set(newMetadata, operation.value);         // no __proto__/constructor/prototype rejection

The request schema (UpdateMetadataRequestBody) types key as a plain string with no validation,
and @jsonhero/[email protected] walks __proto__ as an ordinary segment → the assignment lands on
Object.prototype.

Proof of Concept

Self-host ghcr.io/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev:v4-beta. Authenticated with a **normal environment
API key** (tr_dev_…) and any run id of that environment.

curl -X PUT "http://localhost:8030/api/v1/runs/run_cmqr2bsyo00013js2twwhdsfu/metadata" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer tr_dev_<env_key>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{"operations":[{"type":"set","key":"$.__proto__.polluted","value":"PWNED"}]}'

Result — `Object.prototype.polluted = "PWNED"` process-wide. Observed in the webapp logs:

  1. The request's own query is corrupted — polluted:"PWNED" injected into every object Prisma enumerates:
   prisma.taskRun.updateMany({ where:{ id:"…", metadataVersion:2, polluted:"PWNED" },
     data:{ …, metadataVersion:{ increment:1, polluted:"PWNED" }, polluted:"PWNED" }, polluted:"PWNED" })
   -> Unknown argument `polluted`
  1. Cross-tenant authentication break — the *next* request from a different client (a worker's POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue) fails inside findEnvironmentByApiKey:
   prisma.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({ where:{ apiKey:"…", polluted:"PWNED" },
     include:{ project:true, …, polluted:"PWNED" } })  -> PrismaClientValidationError

i.e. one tenant's request breaks authentication for other tenants' workers → their jobs stop
being dequeued/processed.

  1. Denial of service — full process crash. The uncaughtException in prom-client (Error: Added label "polluted" is not included in initial labelset: [ 'kind' ]) crashes the webapp process. Demonstrated with a second tenant: Tenant B (a *different* org/env, with its own API key) had a working request (POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue → HTTP 400, auth OK) before the attack; immediately after Tenant A's single attack request, B's request returned HTTP 000 (no response) — the whole multi-tenant webapp was down. Logs show the crash at 20:53:41 and the process auto-restarting ~3s later (FairQueue/ScheduleEngine started). Repeating the attack in a loop yields a crash-loop = sustained DoS for all tenants.

*(Note: the metadata endpoint itself swallows the Prisma failure with ignoreError:true and still
returns HTTP 200 — the damage is the process-wide contamination observed in the logs, not the
endpoint's status code.)*

Impact

A low-privilege caller (one normal environment API key, one request) pollutes Object.prototype
in the shared multi-tenant webapp process, causing:

  • Full cross-tenant denial of service — the resulting uncaughtException crashes the webapp process, taking the service down for all tenants (demonstrated: a second tenant's request returned HTTP 000 immediately after the attack). Repeating the request produces a crash-loop / sustained DoS. Even without the crash, contaminated Prisma queries break other tenants' worker authentication, halting job processing.
  • A prototype-pollution primitive usable for further gadget chains (auth/logic bypass, etc.).

Suggested remediation

  1. Reject dangerous path segments in operation.key before building the path — block __proto__, constructor, prototype (and validate the $.-rooted JSONHero path shape).
  2. Build metadata on a null-prototype object (Object.create(null)) and/or use a pollution-safe setter, so __proto__ cannot reach Object.prototype.
  3. Upgrade/replace @jsonhero/path for a version that is prototype-pollution safe, or wrap its .set() with a guard.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-08-13 20:54 UTC
Modified
2026-08-13 21:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@trigger.dev/core

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 3.3.8, fixed 4.5.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

4.5.6

Fix

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences