gix
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.83.0(semver)
Fixed versions
0.83.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.83.0cargo update -p gix --precise 0.83.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-82253
gix's submodule name validation bypass + trust inheritance flaw enables path traversal and credential disclosure
Summary
Submodule name validation bypass plus missing validation in production code paths allows path traversal via crafted .gitmodules. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), this enables reading arbitrary git repository configs (including credentials) from traversed paths with full trust (CWE-22, CWE-200).
Details
Bug 1: Validation bypass in `gix-validate/src/submodule.rs` (lines 27-42)
The name() function uses name.find(b"..") which returns only the FIRST occurrence. If the first .. is embedded in a non-traversal context, the function returns Ok without checking subsequent ../ sequences:
pub fn name(name: &BStr) -> Result<&BStr, name::Error> {
match name.find(b"..") {
Some(pos) => {
let &b = name.get(pos + 2).ok_or(name::Error::ParentComponent)?;
if b == b'/' || b == b'\\' {
Err(name::Error::ParentComponent)
} else {
Ok(name) // Returns Ok without checking rest of string
}
}
None => Ok(name),
}
}
Bypass: a..b/../../../.git/ passes because find(b"..") returns position 1 (the .. in a..b), checks name[3] == b'b', and returns Ok. The real /../../../ is never checked.
Bug 2: Validation never called in production
gix_validate::submodule::name() has zero production callers (only test code). The names() iterator in gix-submodule/src/access.rs:29 explicitly documents it returns "unvalidated names."
git_dir() at gix/src/submodule/mod.rs:198-204 constructs filesystem paths from raw names:
pub fn git_dir(&self) -> PathBuf {
self.state.repo.common_dir().join("modules").join(gix_path::from_bstr(self.name()))
}
Bug 3: Trust inheritance bypass in `Submodule::open()`
At gix/src/submodule/mod.rs:270, open() clones the parent repository's options:
match crate::open_opts(self.git_dir_try_old_form()?, self.state.repo.options.clone()) {
The parent's options.git_dir_trust is Some(Trust::Full). At gix/src/open/repository.rs:103-104:
if options.git_dir_trust.is_none() {
options.git_dir_trust = gix_sec::Trust::from_path_ownership(&git_dir)?.into();
}
Since trust is already Some(Full), the ownership check is skipped entirely. The traversed path is opened with Trust::Full regardless of ownership, bypassing gitoxide's safe-directory protections.
PoC
Compiled and executed in Rust 1.94.1 --release mode. All bypass cases confirmed:
BYPASS a..b/../../../.git/ -> PASSED validation
git_dir = .git/modules/a..b/../../../.git/
normalized = .git/ (parent repo!)
BYPASS x..y/../../../.git/config -> PASSED validation
git_dir = .git/modules/x..y/../../../.git/config
normalized = .git/config
Attack chain
.gitmodules: [submodule "x..y/../../.."]
path = innocent
url = https://attacker.com/repo.git
submodule.open() or submodule.status():git_dir() returns .git/modules/x..y/../../.. which resolves to the parent .git/open_opts() is called with Trust::Full (inherited from parent, ownership check skipped).git/config is fully parsedRepository object exposes all config values from the traversed path:remote.origin.url (may contain https://user:[email protected]/...)http.extraHeader (often Authorization: Bearer <token>)credential.* sectionscore.sshCommandrepo.config_snapshot().string("http.extraHeader"), repo.find_remote("origin"), etc.Impact
A crafted .gitmodules in a malicious repository causes gitoxide to open arbitrary git directories as submodule repositories with full trust, exposing their configuration including credentials. This is the same class of vulnerability as GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c (path traversal), but through the submodule name vector with an additional trust bypass.
The trust inheritance is the critical amplifier: without it, the traversed path would undergo ownership checks that could block the attack. With it, any git directory reachable via ../ is opened with full trust.
Honest limitations
open() or status() on submodules (tools that only list submodules are not affected)Suggested fix
.. occurrences (iterate, not single find)gix_validate::submodule::name() in git_dir() before constructing the pathgit_dir_trust from parent when opening submodule repos -- always re-derive trust from path ownershipSeverity
High. Network vector (via clone), requires user interaction (submodule operations). The trust bypass enables credential disclosure from traversed git directories. Confidentiality impact is high.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.83.0 (semver)0.83.0
0.83.0cargo update -p gix --precise 0.83.00, fixed 0.11.1 (semver)0.11.1
0.11.1cargo update -p gix-validate --precise 0.11.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0