github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.2.4(semver)
Fixed versions
4.2.4
Fix
- Fixed version
4.2.4go get github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-102663, GO-2026-6113
OpenList: Search metadata/count disclosure via Non-Separator-Aware Path Check in Bleve Search
Summary
An authorization bypass and information disclosure vulnerability exists in the search API of Openlist. Due to a non-separator-aware path check and unfiltered backend counting, a low-privileged user can bypass their assigned BasePath restrictions to discover and access metadata of files residing in unauthorized sibling directories.
Details
This vulnerability stems from two combined logic flaws when the bleve search engine is utilized:
server/handles/search.go), the application attempts to restrict search results to the user's allowed namespace using a simple prefix check: strings.HasPrefix(node.Parent, user.BasePath). Because this function is not path-separator aware, a user with a BasePath restricted to /base will successfully pass the authorization check for a completely separate directory named /base2 (since "/base2" starts with "/base").bleve backend (internal/search/bleve/search.go) searches the index globally and ignores the req.Parent boundary. Even if the application later successfully filters out unauthorized items from the Content array (e.g., via CanAccess meta password checks), it still returns the raw Total count provided by the search backend. This allows an attacker to perform blind data-enumeration, confirming the existence of sensitive files outside their namespace by observing the Total count.PoC
Prerequisites:
bleve. Build the index./base and /base2./base2/secret_financial_report.pdf.Base path to /base.Exploitation Steps:
POST /api/fs/search HTTP/1.1
Host: <your-openlist-host>
Authorization: <test-user-token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"parent": "/",
"keywords": "secret",
"page": 1,
"per_page": 20,
"scope": 0
}
strings.HasPrefix("/base2", "/base") == true), the metadata for secret_financial_report.pdf will be leaked in the response Content. - Alternatively, even if access is further blocked by folder-level passwords, the Total field will return > 0, allowing the attacker to blindly confirm the existence of the keyword "secret" in unauthorized global directories.<img width="2112" height="1381" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9f8c5e18-8744-4363-8d3f-5e6cf691f061" />
Impact
This is an Information Disclosure and Horizontal/Vertical Privilege Escalation vulnerability. Any authenticated user can enumerate hidden infrastructure, verify the existence of sensitive files (e.g., passwords, internal documents), and extract file metadata across the entire storage namespace, completely defeating the BasePath isolation mechanism.
Remediation Recommendations
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 4.2.4 (semver)4.2.4
4.2.4go get github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0