github.com/ctfer-io/romeo/webserver
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.2.2(semver)
Fixed versions
0.2.2
Fix
- Fixed version
0.2.2go get github.com/ctfer-io/romeo/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32805, GO-2026-4719
Romeo is vulnerable to Archive Slip due to missing checks in sanitization
Summary
The sanitizeArchivePath function in webserver/api/v1/decoder.go (lines 80-88) is vulnerable to a path traversal bypass due to a missing trailing path separator in the strings.HasPrefix check. A crafted tar archive can write files outside the intended destination directory.
Vulnerable Code
File: webserver/api/v1/decoder.go, lines 80-88
func sanitizeArchivePath(d, t string) (v string, err error) {
v = filepath.Join(d, t)
if strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d)) {
return v, nil
}
return "", &ErrPathTainted{
Path: t,
}
}
The function is called at line 48 inside [*Decompressor].Unzip, which is invoked by Decode (line 80) during execution of the webserver CLI (command download).
Root Cause
strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d)) does not append a trailing / to the directory prefix, causing a directory name prefix collision. If the destination is /home/user/extract-output and a tar entry is named ../extract-outputevil/pwned, the joined path /home/user/extract-outputevil/pwned passes the prefix check — it starts with /home/user/extract-output — even though it is entirely outside the intended directory.
Steps to Reproduce
ReadWriteMany PVC (or the webserver itself) copies a poc-path-traversal.tar into the coverdir mount path. The archive contains legitimate coverage files alongside two crafted entries with path-traversal names. webserver download \
--server http://localhost:8080 \
--directory /home/user/extract-output
unzip processes the zip stream. For the malicious entries: // entry name: ../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt
filepath.Join("/home/user/extract-output", "../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt")
=> "/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt"
strings.HasPrefix("/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt",
"/home/user/extract-output")
=> true // BUG: prefix collision; file lands OUTSIDE target dir
Both malicious entries are written outside /home/user/extract-output/. The legitimate coverage files land correctly inside it.
Impact
Successful exploitation gives an attacker arbitrary file write on the machine running the webserver CLI. Real-world primitives include:
~/.bashrc / ~/.zshrc / ~/.profile for RCE on next shell login~/.ssh/authorized_keys for persistent SSH backdoor~/.kube/config to hijack cluster accessThe attack surface is widened by the default ReadWriteMany PVC access mode, which means any pod in the cluster with the PVC mounted can inject the payload — not just the Romeo webserver itself.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.2.2 (semver)0.2.2
0.2.2go get github.com/ctfer-io/romeo/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0