Details
This is distinct from the documented "Multimodal Media UUID Security" guidance in docs/usage/security.md, which covers only integrity/confidentiality consequences of uuid collisions (a caller silently receiving another caller's media). The guidance does not mention availability, and following it does not help: the attacker here deliberately collides with *their own* uuid, and the fatal element is the missing consistency check on the P1 hit path plus the unsynchronized eviction of the two caches.
Suggested remediation (any one of these breaks the kill chain):
- On a P1 receiver-cache hit, validate the cached item against the request's
mm_position(modality and expected embedding count); on mismatch, treat it as a miss (MultiModalCacheMissError) or reject the request — never substitute silently. - Make the feature/placeholder count mismatch in
_merge_multimodal_embeddingsa per-request error instead of a fatal engine exception (also requested by #55546). - Bind server-side cache identity to content even when a uuid is provided (e.g.
hash(content) + uuid), eliminating forged-hash cache hits entirely. - Synchronize P0/P1 evictions (the engine already pushes
invalidateto P0 on cache-miss; eviction-direction sync would close the remaining drift).
A public fix is available here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/57833