github.com/moby/spdystream
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.5.1(semver)
Fixed versions
0.5.1
Fix
- Fixed version
0.5.1go get github.com/moby/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35469, GO-2026-4958
SpdyStream: DOS on CRI
The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate
attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A
remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can
cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of
malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash.
Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected:
numSettings from the payload and allocates a slice of that size
without checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker
can set numSettings to a value far exceeding the actual payload,
triggering a large allocation before any setting data is read.
parseHeaderValueBlock reads a 32-bitnumHeaders from the decompressed header block and allocates anhttp.Header map of that size with no upper bound.
read as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with
no validation.
Because SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire
payload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser
interprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is
enough to exhaust process memory.
Impact
Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly
or through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can
send SPDY frames to the service can crash the process with a single
crafted SPDY control frame, causing denial of service.
Affected versions
github.com/moby/spdystream <= v0.5.0
Fix
v0.5.1 addresses the receive-side allocation bugs and adds related
hardening:
Core fixes:
checks that numSettings is consistent with the declared frame
length (numSettings <= (length-4)/8) before allocating.
parseHeaderValueBlock enforces a maximumnumber of headers per frame (default: 1000).
lengths are checked against a per-field size limit (default: 1 MiB)
before allocation.
now closes the underlying net.Conn when it encounters anInvalidControlFrame error, preventing further exploitation on the
same connection.
Additional hardening:
that payloads fit within the 24-bit length field, preventing the
library from producing invalid frames.
Configurable limits:
NewConnectionWithOptions orthe lower-level spdy.NewFramerWithOptions with functional options:WithMaxControlFramePayloadSize, WithMaxHeaderFieldSize, andWithMaxHeaderCount.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.5.1 (semver)0.5.1
0.5.1go get github.com/moby/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0