Advisory

GHSA-pc3f-x583-g7j2

Also known as: CVE-2026-35469, GO-2026-4958

Summary

SpdyStream: DOS on CRI

Details

The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate
attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A
remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can
cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of
malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash.

Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected:

  1. SETTINGS entry count -- The SETTINGS frame reader reads a 32-bit

numSettings from the payload and allocates a slice of that size
without checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker
can set numSettings to a value far exceeding the actual payload,
triggering a large allocation before any setting data is read.

  1. Header count -- parseHeaderValueBlock reads a 32-bit

numHeaders from the decompressed header block and allocates an
http.Header map of that size with no upper bound.

  1. Header field size -- Individual header name and value lengths are

read as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with
no validation.

Because SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire
payload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser
interprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is
enough to exhaust process memory.
Impact
 Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly
or through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can
send SPDY frames to the service can crash the process with a single
crafted SPDY control frame, causing denial of service.
Affected versions
 github.com/moby/spdystream <= v0.5.0
Fix
 v0.5.1 addresses the receive-side allocation bugs and adds related
hardening:

Core fixes:

  • SETTINGS entry-count validation -- The SETTINGS frame reader now

checks that numSettings is consistent with the declared frame
length (numSettings <= (length-4)/8) before allocating.

  • Header count limit -- parseHeaderValueBlock enforces a maximum

number of headers per frame (default: 1000).

  • Header field size limit -- Individual header name and value

lengths are checked against a per-field size limit (default: 1 MiB)
before allocation.

  • Connection closure on protocol error -- The connection read loop

now closes the underlying net.Conn when it encounters an
InvalidControlFrame error, preventing further exploitation on the
same connection.

Additional hardening:

  • Write-side bounds checks -- All frame write methods now verify

that payloads fit within the 24-bit length field, preventing the
library from producing invalid frames.

Configurable limits:

  • Callers can adjust the defaults using NewConnectionWithOptions or

the lower-level spdy.NewFramerWithOptions with functional options:
WithMaxControlFramePayloadSize, WithMaxHeaderFieldSize, and
WithMaxHeaderCount.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-04-16 20:44 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:51 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/moby/spdystream

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.5.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.5.1

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences