Advisory

GHSA-pc5q-qfxp-ggqv

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Extensive regression tests were added covering the full octal range (including the \200-\377 high-byte range and the \400-\777 overflow range for escapeSeqDecode), the pre-existing digit-count/truncation edge cases, and both PoC payloads verbatim.

Mitigation
Upgrade to the patched release once available. If upgrading isn't immediately possible, the specific code change is:

for (i+1+j < inputLen) && (j < 3) {
    buf[j] = input[i+1+j]
    j++
    if i+1+j >= inputLen || !isodigit(input[i+1+j]) {
        break
    }
}
...
nn, _ := strconv.ParseUint(string(buf), 8, 8)

Severity (revised 2026-10-02)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N (5.8, Medium).

Attack Complexity is Low: JavaScript engines decode legacy octal escapes in non-strict string literals (ECMAScript Annex B), the standard behaviour jsDecode emulates, so the request alone triggers the discrepancy. The previous vector (S:U/C:L/I:L, 6.5) scored Confidentiality and Integrity separately for what is a single inspection bypass.

Impact metrics follow the convention used across Coraza's WAF-bypass advisories: the vulnerable component is Coraza, but the impact lands on the protected application, so Scope is Changed. The bypass hides a payload from inspection; the application still has to be vulnerable to it, so Integrity is Low and Confidentiality is not scored separately.

_AI involvement in this section: Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), via Claude Code, re-derived the CVSS vector from the project's triage guidance (AGENTS.md, "CVSS preconditions get verified, not copied from the report") and drafted this text. A human maintainer (fzipi) chose the S:C/I:L impact convention and directed this update._

Sources & licences