github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.11.0(semver)
Fixed versions
0.11.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.11.0go get github.com/russellhaering/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: GO-2026-4764
Unsigned SAML LogoutRequest Acceptance in gosaml2
Summary
The ValidateEncodedLogoutRequestPOST function in gosaml2 accepts completely unsigned SAML LogoutRequest messages even when SkipSignatureValidation is set to false. When validateElementSignature returns dsig.ErrMissingSignature, the code in decode_logout_request.go:60-62 silently falls through to process the unverified XML element instead of rejecting it. An attacker who can reach the SP's Single Logout endpoint can forge a LogoutRequest for any user, terminating their session without possessing the IdP's signing key.
Affected Version
github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2main (as of 2026-03-16)decode_logout_request.go, lines 58-69Vulnerable Code
// decode_logout_request.go:57-69
var requestSignatureValidated bool
if !sp.SkipSignatureValidation {
el, err = sp.validateElementSignature(el)
if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
// Unfortunately we just blew away our Response
el = doc.Root() // <-- BUG: falls through with unsigned element
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if el == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing transformed logout request")
} else {
requestSignatureValidated = true
}
}
When ErrMissingSignature is returned, the code resets el to the raw document root and continues. The requestSignatureValidated variable remains false, but no error is returned. The unsigned LogoutRequest is unmarshalled and passed to ValidateDecodedLogoutRequest, which performs attribute/issuer checks but does not verify that a signature was present.
Attack Details
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Attack vector | Network (HTTP POST to SLO endpoint) |
| Authentication required | None |
| Payload size | ~450 bytes (unsigned XML) |
| User interaction | None |
| Complexity | Low -- only requires knowledge of the SP's SLO URL and IdP issuer |
| CVSS estimate | 7.5 (High) -- Network/Low/None/None, Availability impact |
Impact
LogoutRequest with the victim's NameID. This is a targeted denial-of-service.Suggested Fix
When ErrMissingSignature is returned and SkipSignatureValidation is false, the function should return an error instead of falling through:
// decode_logout_request.go -- fixed version
var requestSignatureValidated bool
if !sp.SkipSignatureValidation {
el, err = sp.validateElementSignature(el)
if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
// FIXED: reject unsigned requests when signature validation is required
return nil, fmt.Errorf("logout request is not signed: %w", dsig.ErrMissingSignature)
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if el == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing transformed logout request")
} else {
requestSignatureValidated = true
}
}
This ensures that unsigned LogoutRequest messages are rejected when SkipSignatureValidation is false, matching the behavior that operators expect when they configure signature enforcement.
Attached lab
f1_unsigned_logout.zip
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.11.0 (semver)0.11.0
0.11.0go get github.com/russellhaering/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0