Advisory

GHSA-pf56-329r-95rw

Also known as: CVE-2026-59891

Summary

Credential confusion in @sigstore/oci can leak registry credentials to an attacker-controlled registry

Details

Impact

This is a credential-exposure / credential-confusion issue.

getRegistryCredentials() reads credentials from the Docker config file (~/.docker/config.json) and selects an entry by checking whether any configured auth key contains the target registry string:

Object.keys(dockerConfig.auths || {}).find((key) => key.includes(registry))

Because this is a substring match rather than an exact host match, credentials configured for one registry can be selected for — and transmitted to — a *different* registry whose hostname has a substring relationship with a configured auth key (for example, an attacker-controlled cr.io matches a configured ghcr.io).

Who is impacted: Any consumer of @sigstore/oci that uploads artifacts to an OCI registry using credentials from a Docker config, where the destination registry/image reference can be influenced by an untrusted party. This includes @actions/attest and the actions/attest, actions/attest-build-provenance, and actions/attest-sbom GitHub Actions when run with push-to-registry: true, where the subject-name input determines the destination registry.

This is classified as a critical vulnerability given the potential, in a theoretical worst-case scenario, to expose long-lived registry credentials. However, in practice, exploitation requires all of the following:

  • The Docker config on the host contains credentials for a registry.
  • The destination registry/image reference is influenced by an untrusted source.
  • The attacker controls a registry whose hostname is a substring of (or is otherwise contained within) a configured Docker auth key.

Under those conditions, registry credentials present on the host (e.g. a GHCR, Docker Hub, or cloud-registry token) can be sent to an attacker-controlled registry during the authentication exchange.

Patches

Fixed in `@sigstore/[email protected]`. Credential selection now requires an exact host match: both the target registry and each Docker auth key are canonicalized — stripping any https?:// scheme and path and normalizing the Docker Hub aliases (index.docker.io / registry-1.docker.io / docker.io) — and compared for equality. When no exact match exists, credential lookup now fails rather than falling back to an unrelated credential.

  • Affected versions: <= 0.7.0 (all releases from 0.1.0).
  • Patched version: 0.7.1.

Downstream consumers should pick up the patched @sigstore/oci; subsequent releases of @actions/attest and the actions/attest* GitHub Actions will bundle the fix.

Workarounds

  • Treat the destination registry/image reference as trusted input — do not allow untrusted sources to influence the registry/image reference passed to @sigstore/oci (or the subject-name of actions/attest* when push-to-registry: true).
  • Limit the credentials available in the host's Docker config to only those required for the operation, and avoid authenticating to registries whose hostnames have substring relationships with potential untrusted destinations.
  • Scope registry tokens narrowly and prefer short-lived credentials.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-07-21 19:34 UTC
Modified
2026-07-21 19:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@sigstore/oci

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.7.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.7.1

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences