gitoxide
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.52.1(semver)
Fixed versions
0.52.1
Fix
- Fixed version
0.52.1cargo update -p gitoxide --precise 0.52.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-82252
gix and gitoxide's symlinked .gitmodules are followed and parsed from outside of the repository
Summary
attachments:
pocs.zip
When Repository::submodules() loads submodule metadata, it prefers the worktree .gitmodules file if that path exists. In the current implementation, the path is read with std::fs::read(), which follows symlinks. As a result, a repository can present a symlinked .gitmodules that points outside the repository, and gitoxide will parse the out-of-repository bytes as submodule configuration.
This is a repository-boundary violation. A caller using the high-level submodule API can believe it is reading repository-local submodule metadata, while the bytes are actually coming from an arbitrary file outside the repository tree.
Root cause analysis
The relevant flow is:
.gitmodules path as workdir/.gitmodules.std::fs::read(&path) and immediately parses the bytes as a submodule configuration file.Repository::submodules() exposes the parsed entries through the high-level API.The issue is not in the parser. The issue is that the worktree path is treated as an ordinary file without checking whether it is a symlink, and without checking whether the canonicalized target remains inside the repository worktree.
Because std::fs::read() follows symlinks, a malicious repository can cause gitoxide to ingest bytes from an attacker-chosen location outside the repository. The resulting Submodule objects then expose name, path, and url values derived from that external file.
Reproduction steps
Use the attached PoC zip that contains the pocs/ workspace.
pocs/F001. ```bash
cargo run --quiet
```
pocs/F001/result.txt.Important outputs include:
gitmodules_symlink=.../victim-repo/.gitmodulessymlink_target=.../outside/modules.confparsed_name=symlinkedparsed_path=deps/symlinkedparsed_url=https://attacker.example/symlinked.gitThese outputs show that gitoxide parsed the submodule configuration from the symlink target outside the repository, not from repository-local bytes.
Impact
Confirmed impact:
Repository::submodules();name, path, and url;This report does not claim direct command execution from this code path by itself. The demonstrated impact is metadata injection across the repository boundary.
Recommended fix
A safe fix is to stop silently following symlinks for the worktree .gitmodules path in this loading path.
Reasonable options include:
symlink_metadata() / lstatstyle checks and reject symlinked .gitmodules when loading from the worktree;.gitmodules from the index or HEAD tree rather than following the worktree path.At minimum, the worktree path should not silently follow symlinks to arbitrary external files.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.52.1 (semver)0.52.1
0.52.1cargo update -p gitoxide --precise 0.52.10, fixed 0.83.0 (semver)0.83.0
0.83.0cargo update -p gix --precise 0.83.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0