Advisory

GHSA-pg59-5vwg-4jxq

Also known as: CVE-2026-58268, GO-2026-6550

Summary

SIPGO: DoS via unvalidated Content-Length in the stream parser

Details

Summary

The stream parser allocates the SIP body buffer from the Content-Length header before validating its size, which can lead to an unauthenticated DoS.

Details

ParserStream.parseSingle allocates the body buffer from the declared Content-Length with no size check (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parser_stream.go#L195):

body := make([]byte, contentLength)   // contentLength is client-controlled, up to 2^32-1 (uint32)

The ParseMaxMessageLength (65535) check is in the caller ParseNext (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parser_stream.go#L132), and only runs after parseSingle has already allocated the buffer.

PoC

Tested on emiago/sipgo v1.4.0 (latest).

Send a single message with a large Content-Length and no body to a SIP server:

INVITE sip:[email protected] SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP attacker.example;branch=z9hG4bK1
From: <sip:[email protected]>;tag=1
To: <sip:[email protected]>
Call-ID: [email protected]
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Content-Length: 4000000000                     // <- a large Content-Length

Suggested Fix

Validate contentLength against ParseMaxMessageLength before the allocation.

Impact

Unauthenticated DoS. Any service using sipgo with a stream transport (TCP/TLS/WS/WSS) can be forced to run out of memory.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-09-22 19:57 UTC
Modified
2026-10-01 20:55 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/emiago/sipgo

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.4.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.4.1

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences