github.com/emiago/sipgo
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.4.1(semver)
Fixed versions
1.4.1
Fix
- Fixed version
1.4.1go get github.com/emiago/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-58268, GO-2026-6550
SIPGO: DoS via unvalidated Content-Length in the stream parser
Summary
The stream parser allocates the SIP body buffer from the Content-Length header before validating its size, which can lead to an unauthenticated DoS.
Details
ParserStream.parseSingle allocates the body buffer from the declared Content-Length with no size check (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parser_stream.go#L195):
body := make([]byte, contentLength) // contentLength is client-controlled, up to 2^32-1 (uint32)
The ParseMaxMessageLength (65535) check is in the caller ParseNext (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parser_stream.go#L132), and only runs after parseSingle has already allocated the buffer.
PoC
Tested on emiago/sipgo v1.4.0 (latest).
Send a single message with a large Content-Length and no body to a SIP server:
INVITE sip:[email protected] SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP attacker.example;branch=z9hG4bK1
From: <sip:[email protected]>;tag=1
To: <sip:[email protected]>
Call-ID: [email protected]
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Content-Length: 4000000000 // <- a large Content-Length
Suggested Fix
Validate contentLength against ParseMaxMessageLength before the allocation.
Impact
Unauthenticated DoS. Any service using sipgo with a stream transport (TCP/TLS/WS/WSS) can be forced to run out of memory.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.4.1 (semver)1.4.1
1.4.1go get github.com/emiago/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0